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FRANCHISE CONTRACT CLAUSES AND THE
FRANCHISOR'S DUTY OF CARE TOWARD
ITS FRANCHISEES
ROBERT W. EMERSON*
Franchising is an attractive business opportunity for both
the franchisor and franchisee. The "franchise relationship,"
however, is not easy to define. It has various aspects with each
party having different expectations about the other's performance
responsibilities. In the typical franchise relationship, the
franchisor and franchisee will sign a "franchise agreement" that
codifies the rights and responsibilities of each party. Although
the agreements are detailed and comprehensive, it is impossible
to predict what situations will develop after the parties sign the
contract.
In this Article, Professor Emerson examines the criteria that
he believes courts should use to analyze the various aspects of the
franchise relationship. He argues that the complex relationship
calls for the application of three distinct standards of care: fidu-
ciary relationship, good cause, and the implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing. Professor Emerson details the appropriate
standard of care to use for many different types of franchise
clauses. Utilizing these standards and applying them consistently
will, he maintains, clearly define the scope of the franchise rela-
tionship, enabling the parties to settle disputes fairly without the
need for costly litigation.
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Assume that two parties, Fred Franchisee (Fred) and Fast-Food
Franchisor (FFF), sign a franchising agreement. They begin a long-term
relationship that encompasses numerous subjects, including Fred's business
site, his training and financing, and the royalties and other fees Fred must
pay to FFF. The agreement between the parties covers details such as the
system's advertising program and Fred's corresponding expenses; FFF's
operational standards, which Fred must meet; FFF's auditing of Fred's
books and inspection of his business premises; Fred's covenant not to com-
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pete against FFF; the right of FFF to assign its interest; Fred's rights and
duties concerning FFF's trademarks; the insurance Fred must obtain; FFF's
right to terminate Fred's franchise; and the supplies offered to Fred by FFF
or FFF-approved suppliers.
If a dispute were to arise over fees, intellectual property, or other set
terms such as insurance requirements or arbitration and venue stipulations,
the franchise agreement typically would reflect a full accord reached before
the contract started; therefore, the written terms could stand alone.
Franchisors and franchisees, however, tend to have legitimate expectations
about their franchise relationship that often go far beyond the terms speci-
fied in their written agreement. If the parties later disagree about other
terms-especially those dependent upon an ongoing series of judgments by
the franchisor-then concepts of fairness and rationality would require the
parties to reconsider any naive notions they may have had about a com-
pleted franchise contract necessitating no judicial or statutory refinements.
FFF may point to contractual clauses giving it almost unfettered power to
restrict Fred's competition, to assign FFF's rights and duties while barring
any franchise transfers by Fred, and even to terminate or decline to renew
Fred's franchise. Nevertheless, Fred, like most franchisees, expects far
more than what the written document promises. A court that reads the
franchise contract literally can adequately interpret and apply some provi-
sions, but may have to adopt a wholly different approach to other clauses to
effectuate the "spirit" of the franchise agreement.
When the franchise contract clauses involve areas in which the fran-
chisee depends upon the franchisor's judgment and fiduciary-like status, the
need to impose extra-contractual standards is even clearer. Yet when courts
review disputes over such clauses, they generally hesitate to do anything
more than quickly examine whether the parties acted in good faith and exer-
cised fair dealing. That remains so even when the courts examine crucial
franchisor decisions that affect the franchised business's continuing viabil-
ity. Although different clauses require different standards of review, the
courts generally have difficulty dividing a written contract and applying
several different interpretative standards to it. Courts judge fiduciary mat-
ters such as site selection, financing, opening, advertising, and training by
the same common law of contracts methods that they use for set terms such
as royalties. The former terms are subject to the franchisor's discretionary
power over the course of a long franchise relationship, but they are judged
no differently from other contractual provisions that were established at the
outset of the franchise relationship and have not thereafter been subject to
the franchisor's discretionary interpretation or enforcement.
In short, the law of franchising must recognize the various implications
of the franchise relationship, especially the divergent standards by which
1994]
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different franchise contract clauses should be interpreted and applied. This
Article discusses the development and use of such standards.
B. Franchise Regulation and the Establishment of Franchise
Relationship Standards
The popularity of franchising as a marketing technique is not surpris-
ing. Franchising presents a relatively inexpensive method for rapid expan-
sion into new markets and diverse geographic areas. A business may, by
franchising, sell its goods, services, or overall business format through inde-
pendently owned and financed outlets that pay the originating business roy-
alties and other fees.1 Franchisees probably are drawn to franchising by the
prospect of running their own businesses while at the same time benefitting
from the expertise, credibility, and purchasing power of a much larger
business.
Franchising continues to boom. In the past decade, the growth of
franchising has easily outpaced overall economic growth.2 Over half a mil-
lion franchises operate in the United States, and they account for more than
1. A franchise involves a continuing contractual relationship in which the franchisor grants
the franchisee a right to conduct business or sell products according to the franchisor's marketing
plan and in conjunction with the franchisor's trademark. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-3 (West
1989) (enacted in 1971); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1972);
see also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrED STATES: 1992, at 770-71 (112th ed. 1992) (charting growth of the number and sales of
franchised businesses); Donald P. Horwitz & Walter M. Volpi, Regulating the Franchise Rela-
tionship, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 217, 228 (1980) (observing that franchising encourages the crea-
tion of small, independently-owned businesses). Franchising can be more extensively defined as:
[A] system for the selective distribution of goods and/or services under a brand name
through outlets owned by independent businessmen, called "franchisees." Although the
franchisor supplies the franchisee with know-how and brand identification on a continu-
ing basis, the franchisee enjoys the right to profit and runs the risk of loss. The
franchisor controls the distribution of his goods and/or services through a contract which
regulates the activities of the franchisee, in order to achieve standardization.
ROBERT ROSENBERG & MADELON BEDELL, PRoFrrs FROM FRANCHiSING 41 (1969). For a compre-
hensive treatment of the franchising concept as defined by the commentators, see Robert W.
Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1503, 1506
n.1, 1508-09 (1990).
2. From 1980 to 1991, the United States' gross domestic product (GDP) increased by
109.7%, its total retail sales (TRS) increased by 94.9%, and its retail sales by franchised busi-
nesses (RS-FB) rose 125.4%. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrED STATES: 1993, at 445, 776, 780 (113th ed. 1993) (showing for
those years a GDP increase from $2,708 billion to $5,677.5 billion, a TRS increase from $957.4
billion to $1,865.5 billion, and a RS-FB increase from $336.2 billion to $757.8 billion).
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a third of the nation's total retail sales.' By the end of 1993, they will
probably account for a trillion dollars in annual retail sales.4
Many franchisees, however, suffer business problems directly related
to "insufficient capital, inadequate experience, or incomplete understanding
of the... risks and responsibilities" of owning a franchise.5 In response to
these problems, state and federal legislators enacted disclosure requirements
that utilize perhaps the most effective form of consumer protection:
self-help.6 The prospective franchisee can use information contained in the
3. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors' Liability When Franchisees Are Apparent Agents:
An Empirical and Policy Analysis of "Common Knowledge" about Franchising, 20 HOFSTRA L.
R v. 609, 614-15 & n.13 (1992); see also FTC Official Debunks Franchise "Myths," Reports on
Franchise Rule Enforcement, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) [ 9785, at 22,051 (prepared statement
of Barry J. Cutler, Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, before the Committee on
Small Business of the U.S. House of Representatives, March 20, 1991) ("Most projections expect
that [franchised outlets' percentage of total retail sales] will jump to one-half of all retail sales by
the year 2000.") [hereinafter Franchise "Myths"].
4. Franchise "Myths," supra note 3, 9785, at 22,051.
5. John M. Tifford & Craig Tregillus, The Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule, in
FRANCHIsING 1990: BusmIEss STmRATEGmS AND COMPLIANCE Issues 189, 193 (P.L.I. Commercial
Law & Practice No. 525, 1990); see also Harold Brown, Franchising: The 20-Year Agreement,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1992, at 3, 28 (denying the usual premise that franchisors and franchisees "are
jointly intent on achieving successful operations" inasmuch as a "gross imbalance in the relation-
ship has precluded genuine restraint by franchisors both in the drafting of agreements and in their
administration and termination conduct"); Andrew A. Caffey & Jeffrey E. Kolton, Solving the
Continuing Problems with Earnings Claims, 3 FRANCISE LEGAL Di. 9 (Spec. Symposium Issue,
May 5-6, 1986) (stating that in many circumstances current franchise law makes it impossible for
franchisors to deliver information that is vital to the franchisees).
6. The first state disclosure legislation, enacted by California in 1970, regulated the offer
and sale of business ventures that fit within the definition of "franchise," but did not reach busi-
ness opportunities (defined infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text). CAL. CoRP. CODE
§§ 31,000-31,516 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993). In 1979, North Carolina became the first state to
enact legislation that required written disclosure of non-franchise business ventures. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 66-94 to -100 (1992). In October 1979, the Federal Trade Commission adopted Disclo-
sure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchises and Business Opportunity Ventures,
requiring written disclosure by the sellers of both franchises and business opportunities. 16 C.F.R.
§ 436.1 (1993) [hereinafter FTC Rule] (promulgated October 21, 1979 pursuant to the Federal
Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976)).
The FTC Rule, like other federal legislation, preempts state and local laws to the extent that
those laws conflict with the federal statute. Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines,
Inc., 889 F.2d 751, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that the Federal Aviation Act preempted the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras.
261-262 (1990); thus, the state could not force an air carrier to deal with a would-be agent who
refused to respect a contract restricting advertising of discount prices). However, the FTC Rule
does not preempt consistent state laws, and it permits inconsistent state laws insofar as they pro-
vide prospective purchasers equal or greater protection than that imposed by the FTC Rule. 16
C.F.R. § 436 n.2 (1993); Tousley v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 752 F.2d 96, 100-03 (4th Cir.
1985); Morgan v. Air Brook Limousine, Inc., 510 A.2d 1197, 1205-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1986); Final Guides to the Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures Trade Regulations
Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966 (1979).
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disclosure documents to make as intelligent an investment decision as
possible.7
Twenty-two states regulate the offer and sale of franchises,8 while
twenty-four states regulate the offer and sale of business opportunities.9
7. The goal of the FrC Rule, supra note 6, is to enable prospective franchisees to assess the
potential benefits and risks of their investment by ensuring that they receive full pre-sale disclo-
sure of relevant information about the franchise investment, as well as sufficient time to review
the information before purchase.
The FTC Rule reduces the opportunity for fraudulent conduct by forcing franchisors to
choose from three unattractive disclosure alternatives. First, the seller can make a complete and
accurate disclosure to all potential buyers. Obviously, full disclosure should reduce the potential
for sales abuse by fraudulent franchisors. Second, the franchisor can ignore the FTC Rule and not
make any disclosure. In this case, however, the seller would be strictly liable for any violation of
the FTC Rule and subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation, as well as a permanent
injunction against future violations. 15 U.S.C. § 45() (1988). More importantly, the FTC would
not have to prove that actual misrepresentations, reliance, or damages took place to prevail in an
enforcement action-mere noncompliance would be sufficient. Id. Finally, the franchisor can
comply with the FTC Rule but omit certain required information. In this case, however, the
omitted informatiorn would significantly ease the burden of proof in both private actions for mis-
representations as well as FTC enforcement actions. Brill v. Catfish Shaks of Am., Inc., 727 F.
Supp. 1035, 1042 & n.13 (E.D. La. 1989) (holding plaintiffs allegations that defendant failed to
make certain disclosures relevant as a minimum standard of reasonableness and fairness in a
jurisdiction that applies an objective standard of good faith).
8. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-72-201 to -210 (Michie 1987) (enacted in 1977); CAL. CoRP.
CODE §§ 31,000-31,516 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1970); HAw. REv. STAT. § 482E
(1992) (enacted in 1974); IL... REv. STAT., ch. 121 1/2, paras. 1701-1744 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992) (revised law enacted in 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-2.5-1 to -51 (Bums 1989 & Supp.
1992) (enacted in 1975); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 523H.1-.17 (West Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1992);
MD. Bus. REG. CODE ANN. §§ 14-201 to -233 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1977); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1501-.1546 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1974); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 80C.01-.30 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-51
to -61, 75-77-1 to -19 (Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1975 and 1977, respectively); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 407.400-.420 (1978 & Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 87-401 to -410 (1987
& Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1978) (no registration required); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15
(West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (enacted in 1971); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 680-695 (McKinney 1984
& Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-19-01 to -17 (1989 & Supp. 1991)
(enacted in 1975); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 650.005-.250 (1991) (enacted in 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 19-28-1 to -15 (1989) (enacted in 1973); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-5A-1 to -87 (1986
& Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1501 to -1511 (Supp. 1992) (en-
acted in 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-557 to -574 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992) (enacted in
1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.100.010-.940 (West 1989) (enacted in 1972); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 135.01-.07 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) ("Fair Dealership Law" enacted in 1973); id,
§§ 553.01-.78 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) ("Franchise Investment Law" enacted in 1972). The
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands also have franchise legislation. See D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-1201 to -1208 (Supp. 1991) (enacted in 1989); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10,§§ 278-278d (1978 & Supp. 1989) (enacted in 1964); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12A, § 132 (1982)
(enacted in 1973).
9. ALA. CODE § 8-19-5(20) (1984) (enacted in 1981) (providing solely substantive regula-
tion, with no disclosure or registration requirements); CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1812.200-.221 (West
1985 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-503 to -521 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 559.80-.815 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (en-
acted in 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-410 to -417 (1990 & Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1980); IND.
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Although federal disclosure regulations do not require registration,' ° state
laws governing franchise sales generally require franchisors to register a
detailed offering circular before soliciting prospective franchisees." Regis-
trations ordinarily must contain copies of all advertising and promotional
literature that the franchisor proposes to use and must identify all persons
who will sell the franchises.' 2
CODE Aim. §§ 24-5-8-1 to -21 (Bums Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1984); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 523B.1-.11 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1981); ICY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 367.801-.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987 & Supp. 1988) (first part enacted in 1984); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1821-:1824 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1981, and providing solely
substantive regulation, including surety bond filing, with no disclosure or registration require-
ments); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 4691-4700B (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (enacted in
1979); MD. Bus. REG. CODE ANN. §§ 14-101 to -129 (1992) (enacted in 1980); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 445.902-.903b (West 1989) (enacted in 1977); MnNx. STAT. ANN. §§ 80C.01-.30
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1973); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 59-1701 to -1761 (1988) (en-
acted in 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-E:1-6 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (first enacted in 1977);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-94 to -100 (1992) (enacted in 1977); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1334.01-.99 (Anderson Supp. 1989) (enacted in 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 801-827
(West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-57-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op.
1985 & Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 37-25A-1 to -54 (1986 &
Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1985); Tax. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-16.01 to .17 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1992) (enacted in 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-15-1 to -7 (1992) (enacted in 1981); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-262 to -269 (Michie 1992) (enacted in 1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.110.010-.930 (West 1989) (enacted in 1971).
For the distinction between franchisees and business opportunities, see infra notes 26-32 and
accompanying text.
10. The federal disclosure requirements are met by following a format prescribed by the FTC
or by using the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (described infra notes 11-12 and accompany-
ing text). Final Guides to the Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures Trade Regulation
Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966, 49,970 (1979); see also supra notes 6-7. For more detailed informa-
tion on disclosure under the FTC Rule, see W. MICHAEL GAINER, FRANCHISE AND DIsTRIBUTIoN
LAW AND PRAcnc §§ 5:05-5:25 (1993).
11. Registration is accomplished by the franchisor's submission of an application and filing
fee to the appropriate state authorities. The franchisor generally must register in each state that
mandates registration and in which there is at least one franchise. The heart of every such applica-
tion is the offering circular.
A comprehensive, 23-item Uniform Franchise Offering Circular ("UFOC") was adopted on
September 2, 1975 by the Midwest Securities Administrators Association, now the North Ameri-
can Securities Administrators Association. UFOC is a prevalent format for state disclosure regu-
lations. Of the states requiring registration, 15 have adopted the U1OC as their format for
disclosure. These states are: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) H 2000-2001 & 6026-6027 (1993).
12. State authorities must approve all of the information and material before the offer of any
franchise. A sample UFOC application and the information required therein can be found in Bus.
Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 5828 (1980); see also Bus. Franchise Guide (CCII) 8862 (adopting
amendments to Items 19 & 20 by the FCC on June 15, 1987); Bus. Franchise Guide (CCII) 7541
(1980) (giving supplemental advertising and registration guidelines).
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Substantive statutory law regulates the post-purchase relationship be-
tween franchisor and franchisee in over one-third of the states.13 These
laws are most notable for (1) requiring the franchisor to provide franchisees
notice and a period to cure before terminating or declining to renew
franchises, and (2) restricting the franchisors' rights of termination or non-
renewal to decisions made in "good faith."1 4 Substantive statutes also regu-
late many other aspects of the franchise relationship, affording greater
protection to franchisees on the theory that an imbalance exists in the
franchisor-franchisee relationship."
Despite this extensive regulation, the nature of the relationship be-
tween franchisors and franchisees remains ambiguous. 6 Courts have tried
to define the nature of the relationship by applying common-law contract
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-201 to -210 (Michie 1987); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 31,000-31,516 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20,000 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-133E (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2551 (1975 & Supp.
1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.416 (West 1976 & Supp. 1993) (limited to prohibitions on the
making of intentional misrepresentations in connection with the sale of a franchise); HAW. Rv.
STAT. § 482E (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 121 1/2, paras. 1701-1744 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-2.5-1 to -51 (Bums 1989 & Supp. 1992); IowA CODE ANN.
§§ 523H.I-.17 (West Supp. 1993); MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1501-.1546 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1992); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80C.01-.30 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 87-401 to 410 (1987 & Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West 1989 & Supp.
1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-5A-1 to -87 (1986 & Supp. 1992); TErNN. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-25-1501 to -1511 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-557 to -574 (Michie 1989 & Supp.
1992); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 19.100.010-.940 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 135.01-.07 (West 1989
& Supp. 1992). The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands also have substan-
tive franchise legislation. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1201 to -1208 (Supp. 1991); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 278-278d (1978 & Supp. 1989); V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 12A, § 132 (1982).
14. The Restatement of Contracts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 205 (1979),
the Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989), and a majority of jurisdictions all
recognize that every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and enforcement. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law
Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 app. (1980) (providing an appendix of
cases indicating jurisdictions that explicitly recognize a general obligation of good faith in every
contract at common law).
15. For example, substantive laws may prevent a franchisor from unfairly discriminating
among franchises, from unreasonably prohibiting the transfer or assignment of a franchise, from
failing to repurchase items upon termination or non-renewal, or from interfering with the free
association among franchises. See GARNER, supra note 10, §§ 10:30, 10:34, 10:39, 10:43 (1993)
(describing and citing the state statutes in these areas); see also Emerson, supra note 1, at 1511 &
nn.27-28 (describing and citing the statutes in 16 states that regulate the substance of the franchis-
ing relationship and that bar some or all of the above practices as well as other activities).
16. At a very basic level, there is the problem of different state definitions of a "franchise,"
Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 Bus. LAW.
289, 289-90 (1990). Inasmuch as the franchise itself is a type of business relationship, see supra
note 1, the states' vague or conflicting definitions of that relationship leave the parties-the
franchisor and franchisee-unclear about their rights and responsibilities. In short, the imperfect
statutory and regulatory definitions add to the definitional ambiguities and contradictions found in
the case law. Together, the statutes, regulations, and case law reinforce the franchise parties'
uncertainty about what exactly is the legal relationship between a franchisor and its franchisees.
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principles, fiduciary duty rules, or other intermediate concepts. 17  Still,
when litigants and courts operate without understanding the precise nature
of a franchising relationship, they find it exceedingly difficult to determine
what standard of care is required in a particular franchise agreement. The
rapidly escalating number and size of franchised businesses' render this
problem-the need for more specific definition and delineation-increas-
ingly significant to both the legal and business communities. Furthermore,
as existing franchises mature and agreements come to an end, disputes over
termination, renewal, and other terms of the franchise agreement will arise
ever more frequently. Absent a consensus on the appropriate framework for
franchise law, courts and legislatures increasingly will confront similar fact
patterns and adopt different approaches that will lead to unpredictable
results.
A fundamental step toward clarification and uniformity in the law of
franchising would be to define the basis and scope of the franchise relation-
ship. After distinguishing franchises from other business ventures, 19 one
could then define the nature and scope of the relationship between
franchisor and franchiseefor each clause in the agreement. Most franchise
contracts have various provisions that, in application, require different stan-
dards of care between the franchisor and franchisee. Thus, the nature of the
franchise relationship may depend on the matter in dispute. In some areas,
significantly greater franchisor duties may be customary or otherwise ex-
pected, while in other areas the franchisor and the franchisee are on a more
equal bargaining plane-both in reaching a contract and then in continuing
their relationship. Typical franchise agreement clauses can be classified ac-
cording to the proper application of one of three standards of care: (1) a
fiduciary obligation of the franchisor; (2) a contractual relationship with the
added franchisee protection that franchisors show "good cause" for their
actions; or (3) an ordinary contractual relationship, generally including only
the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
17. See, e.g., Tidmore Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that, under common-law contract principles and the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, disapproval of franchise locations did not violate a franchise agreement); Arnott v. American
Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 880-84 (8th Cir. 1979) (evaluating the nonrenewal of a lease agreement
and finding that a fiduciary relationship existed between the franchisor and the franchisee); Shell
Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (N.J. 1973) (holding that, in addition to common-law
contract principles and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, good cause also must be shown
to justify the non-renewal of a franchise).
18. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
19. Seller-controlled business ventures encompass a wide variety of business relationships,
including business opportunities and franchises. Many of these ventures include promises, or at
least strongly voiced assertions, about the retailer/franchisee's potential profits and seller assist-
ance in marketing. See infra notes 24-60 and accompanying text (defining business opportunities
and franchises).
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By examining court decisions and the standard clauses used in most
franchise agreements, 0 this Article identifies criteria for analyzing various
aspects of the franchise relationship. The Article then proceeds to develop
standards of care appropriate to the nature of the relationship as it exists
under particular contractual provisions. The approach announced in the Ar-
ticle will enable franchisors and franchisees to understand better their re-
spective roles and, thus, eliminate or curtail some disputes.21 Those
disagreements that nonetheless reach the courts will more likely result in
relatively uniform applications of legal principles-similar cases leading to
similar conclusions. Attorneys will then be able to advise their clients with
greater precision and confidence about the likely outcome of franchising
disputes. This heightened capacity to predict results will facilitate negotia-
tion and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, thereby helping to re-
duce, to a small degree,22 overcrowded court dockets.
The Introduction in Part I of the Article is followed by a review, analy-
sis, refinement, and application of contractual and other legal concepts to
the actual agreements entered into by franchisors and franchisees. Part H of
the Article defines the franchise relationship and delineates the criteria for
the three distinct standards of care applicable to franchise contract clauses.
Part III then applies these three standards to clauses usually found in
franchise agreements. It incorporates data from the author's examination of
100 franchise agreements involving fast-food outlets, restaurants, and ice
cream parlors, compared for trends with comparable data from a 1971 study
of 121 fast-food agreements.2" Part IV considers the implementation of the
author's suggested reforms. Both Parts IV and V reach some general con-
clusions about the trends in franchising and why a court analysis of stan-
dards of care dependent upon individual contract clauses should replace the
present unsatisfactory approach of trying to treat all franchise agreements,
and all portions of franchise agreements, the same.
20. University of Wisconsin College of Business Professors Urban B. Ozanne and Shelby D.
Hunt conducted an exhaustive study of franchise contracts. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL
Busmass, 92D CONG., IsT SEss., REPORT PRE'ARED FOR THE SMALL BusINESs ADMINISTRATION:
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FRANCmSING (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter THE ECONOMIC EF.
FECTs oF FRANCHISING]. To update that study, from October 1992 to February 1993, this Arti-
cle's author obtained copies of 100 franchise agreements to verify the frequency and general
content of various, so-called typical provisions. See infra app.
21. The franchising relationship has been analogized to almost every relationship known at
common law (e.g., agency, employment, independent contracting, partnership, marriage, securities
investment, and fiduciary arrangement). Because franchising is relatively new-a distribution and
marketing device of the last few decades, Emerson,'supra note 1, at 1507 & n.8-the common law
provides little guidance in assessing the basis for franchise relationships.
22. Although growing in number, franchising disputes presumably constitute just a small
fraction of the filings in state or federal civil courts. Obviously, the more important result of
refining the parties' duties of care is to improve the franchise relationship itself.
23. THE ECONOMIC EFrcTCs OF FRANcHIsING, supra note 20.
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II. DEFINING FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIPS
A. Business Opportunities24
The first step in understanding the nature of the franchise relationship
is to distinguish it from other business ventures. A franchise involves a
long-term contractual relationship in which the franchisor grants the fran-
chisee a right to conduct business or sell products according to the
franchisor's marketing plan, to use the franchisor's trademark, and often to
adopt its overall business standards. 5 The format that most closely resem-
bles a franchise, but often is not one, is the "business opportunity,"26 which
typically involves a simpler relationship than does the franchise. The busi-
ness opportunity entails a sale of goods or services enabling the purchaser
to start a business. Such a sale expressly or implicitly includes specific
representations from the seller to the purchaser. 7 Representations may
24. "Business opportunities" are also known as "seller-assisted marketing plans.' See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.200-1812.221 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
25. See supra note 1.
26. The definitions of franchise and business opportunity are not mutually exclusive; in some
circumstances, a business venture could fall within both definitions. Kim A. Lambert & Charles
G. Miller, The Definition of a Franchise: A Survey of Existing State Legislative and Judicial
Guidance, FRANcHIsE LJ., Fall 1989, at 3, 4; see also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
See generally Robin D. Glenn, The Applicability of Business Opportunity Laws to Franchisors,
FRANCHISE L.J., Summer 1989, at 3 passim (discussing state business opportunity laws). The title
of the FTC Rule refers to both franchising and business opportunity ventures, and the definition
section of the Rule neither specifically defines a business opportunity venture nor distinguishes it
from a franchise. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1-436.2 (1993).
Both of these business relationships involve common characteristics. Each requires the buyer
to pay a fee to the seller. The requirement that the franchisee receive the tight to sell goods or
services under a marketing plan is similar to the requirement that the business opportunity buyer
receive the right to begin or maintain a business of the business opportunity seller. Finally, both
franchises and business opportunities involve a seller rendering services to a buyer.
In light of these similarities, it is not surprising that the business opportunity laws of many
states provide an express exemption for some or all franchises. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE
§ 31,000 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.5-1 (Bums 1989 & Supp. 1992);
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 445.1501 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFmD LAWS ANN.
§ 37-5A-1 (1986 & Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-557 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.010 (West 1989). However, the legislation enacted by each
state varies so much that a business venture may be subject to the franchise or business opportu-
nity laws of one state but not those of another. H. Bret Lowell & John F. Dienelt, Drafting
Distribution Agreements: The Unwitting Sale of Franchises and Business Opportunities, 11 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 725, 736 (1986). Similarly, a business venture may be subject to the FTC Rule but not
to state franchise or business opportunity statutes. Id.
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-94(1)-(4) (1992). An agreement to distribute goods or services
may take any number of forms and still constitute a franchise and/or business opportunity. It does
not matter what the agreement is called or how the agreement identifies the parties. See Final
Guides to the Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures Trade Regulation Rule, 44 Fed.
Reg. 49,966 (1979); Statement of Basis and Purpose Relating to Disclosure Requirements and
Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,621
(1978). For example, a franchise or business opportunity may exist even though the relationship
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consist of the seller's assertions,2" promises, 29 or monetary guarantees. 30
Typical business opportunities are vending machine routes and businesses
involving the assembly of parts in the home.3 1
Some states' business opportunity statutes are broad enough to cover
franchise relationships. If the state also specifically regulates franchise ar-
rangements, there may be a problem insofar as these often-detailed statutes
conflict or are at cross-purposes. 32 Even when there is no state statute regu-
lating franchises per se, a broad definition of business opportunities might
encompass relationships that traditionally have been considered franchise
arrangements.33
Definitional problems may also arise at the federal level. A business
opportunity may be covered by the same Federal Trade Commission rule
that covers franchises. 34 Such coverage occurs if the business opportunity
is stated to be with a distributor, sales agent, manager, wholesaler, jobber, or licensee. 16 C.F.R.
§ 436.1(a) (1993).
28. For example, the seller may assert that the purchaser will be provided locations for the
use of vending machines, display cases, or other devices. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-94(1)
(1992).
29. The seller may promise to buy products produced by the purchaser that were made with
the seller's goods or services. See, e.g., id. § 66-94(2).
30. Typical monetary guarantees include buy-back options or investment guarantees. See,
e.g., id. § 66-94(3).
31. See, e.g., GARNER, supra note 10, § 6:01, at 1-2 (describing several types of business
opportunities). For two cases involving FTC and state regulation of business opportunities, see In
re Hardy Hardware Centers, Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 6426 (FTC staff advisory opin-
ion, Oct. 9, 1980) (concluding that the FTC disclosure rule subjects a business opportunity's
earnings claims to the same requirements as it does a franchise's earnings claims); In re Florida
Div. of Consumer Servs., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) J 6410 (FTC staff advisory opinion, April
15, 1980) (discussing the overlapping coverage of the FTC disclosure rule and various state stat-
utes regulating the sales of business opportunity ventures); see also FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668
F.2d 1107, 1109-14 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding the trial court's grant of pre-trial orders requested
by the FTC, which alleged that the franchisor had violated the FTC disclosure rule and had en-
gaged in false and misleading representations to prospective franchisees; thus, to permit a com-
plete accounting for fees paid by the allegedly defrauded franchisees, the fmnchisor's assets
remained subject to a pre-judgment attachment and the franchisor was compelled to produce all
documents concerning any of its property interests).
32. Most states resolve any potential conflict by deciding, in the statutes themselves, which
statute governs in the event of a conflict. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.902(a)(iv)
(West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-15-2(1)(b) (1992); Emerson, supra note I, at 1509 n.22.
33. "As a result of ambiguous drafting, under either state or federal law, many franchises
may fall within the definition of a business opportunity." Lambert & Miller, supra note 26, at 4.
For example, Ohio does not regulate the sale of franchises, but its business opportunity statute
specifically addresses issues arising when the seller assists the purchaser in establishing retail
outlets, developing accounts for the sale of goods, or otherwise providing and placing equipment
used in the distribution of goods. OHIO REV. CODE Am. § 1334.01(D)(3)(a)-(b) (Anderson
1992). Thus, a good argument can be made that the Ohio business opportunity law is broad
enough to encompass franchise agreements.
34. See supra note 26. A common misconception among franchisors is that companies with
registered trademarks are exempt from business opportunity laws. A number of business opportu-
nity statutes do exempt marketing programs offered in conjunction with a registered trademark.
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meets three requirements. First, the buyer of the opportunity must offer,
sell, or distribute goods or services either supplied by the seller or its affili-
ate or supplied by a party with whom the seller requires the buyer to do
business.35 Second, the buyer of the business opportunity must pay some-
See CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 36-504(6) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
559.801(l)(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANt. § 51:1821(1)(d) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4691.3A(5) (1988 & Supp. 1992); MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.902(2)(a)(iv) (West 1989); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 66-94(4) (1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 802(3)(b)(3) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE Amq. § 39-57-20(4) (Law.
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1992); S.D. CODiiIED LAws § 37-25A-2(5) (1986 & Supp. 1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-15-2(1)(a)(iv) (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.110.040(7) (West 1989).
However, these exemptions only apply when the "business opportunity" representations-i.e.,
representations that bring the offering within the definition of "business opportunity"-are based
on the seller's provision of a sales or marketing plan. See, e.g., N.C. GEM. STAT. §§ 66-94(4)
(1992). In all other cases, a registered trademark will not exempt a business venture from busi-
ness opportunity laws if the venture includes investment guarantees, buy-back options, or
promises to obtain retail locations.
Whether a seller made other representations to a purchaser, and thus precluded an exemption
from business opportunity laws, can be the crucial issue in contract litigation. In Martin v. Pilot
Indus., 632 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1980), the franchise purchaser successfully argued that the
franchisor had made income guarantees that constituted representations requiring compliance with
the North Carolina Business Opportunity Sales Act's disclosure, bonding, and earnings projection
provisions. Id. at 275-76. Advertisements and promotional literature had stated specific profit
percentages and gross sales assurances, while both the purchase agreement and a pre-purchase
disclosure document disclaimed any guarantees of profit. Id. at 273. Martin illustrates that even
an express disclaimer may not serve to negate an implied representation that could be interpreted
as an earnings claim or projection. Moreover, if the disclaimer does not remove the effects of the
implied representation, then the transaction may fall under a business opportunity statute. Id. at
275; see also Adams v. State, 443 So. 2d 1003, 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the
seller of a business venture, when enjoined from terminating a distributor, discovered that it had
accidentally created a franchise).
35. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1992). The majority of states that regulate the offer and
sale of business opportunities likewise define these opportunities as involving the sale or lease of
goods or services from the business opportunity creator to the party seeking such an opportunity.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.801(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); LA. Rev. STAT. ANt.
§ 51:1821(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); MD. Bus. PEd. CODE ANN. §§ 14-101(b)(1) (1992);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 445.902(2)(a) (West 1989); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 66-94 (1992); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-57-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE AN. § 13-15-(1)(a) (1992);
WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. § 19.110.020(1) (West 1989); accord CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.201(a)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1993) ("any sale or lease or offer to sell or lease"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-504(6) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) ("sale or lease or offer for sell or lease"); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 367.801(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987) ("opportunity to offer, sell or distribute"); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4691.3A (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) ("sale, lease or distribution"). In
most states, the goods or services must be purchased to begin a business. See, e.g., CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1812.201(b)(6) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-504(6) (West
1987 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANNi. § 559.801(1)(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); LA. Rev.
STAT. ANN. § 51:1821(1)(d) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); Micti. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.902(2)(a)(iv) (West 1989); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 66-94(4) (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 802(3)(b)(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-57-20(4) (Law. Co-op. 1985 &
Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-25A-2(1 & 2) (1986 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-15-2(1)(b)(i) (1992). In others, they can be used in an existing business. See, e.g.,
NeB. REv. STAT. § 59-1703 (1988).
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thing to the seller. 6 Third, the seller must assist the buyer in acquiring a
location for the business venture.37
Business opportunity statutes, like franchise laws, require that perti-
nent information be furnished to the purchaser at designated times prior to
the sale.38 The majority of the state statutes also permit business opportu-
nity sellers to use the same format of disclosure required by franchise legis-
lation.39 In addition, the seller of a business opportunity usually must
register the offering circular with the appropriate state agency before at-
tempting to sell the business venture.40
Business opportunity laws often contain provisions comparable to
franchise laws that make certain representations and practices unlawful.41
The business opportunity laws, though, often go further than franchise laws
by requiring the seller to obtain a surety bond or establish a trust account in
favor of potential purchasers 42 and by prohibiting the seller from engaging
36. 16 C.F.R § 436.2(a)(2) (1993).
37. 16 C.F.R § 436.2(a)(1)(ii)(B) (1993). Assistance can come in several forms: the seller
secures retail outlets or accounts for the goods or services to be sold by the buyer; the seller
obtains sites for dispensing of the buyer's goods, such as vending machine locations or rack
displays; or the seller provides the services of a third person to secure outlets, accounts, or loca-
tions for the buyer.
38. In effect, the seller of a business opportunity must make certain representations to the
purchaser. These mandatory representations generally concern information about guarantees of
income, refund of initial investments, repurchase of goods supplied by the seller, and provisions
for vending machines or display racks. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-94(l)-(4) (1992).
39. See GARNER, supra note 10, § 6:03, at 4-5 (referring to business opportunity disclosure
documents "similar to that required for sale of a franchise").
40. Generally, the process for registering a business opportunity offering is less difficult than
registering a franchise offering. See Philip F. Zeidman et al., Franchising: Regulation of Buying
and Selling a Franchise, 34 C.P.S. (BNA), at A-81 to A-84 (1983) (describing procedures for
complying with the business opportunity laws).
41. For example, it would be unlawful for a seller to misrepresent certain information or to
engage in any false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive acts. Id. at A-78, A-83 to A-84.
Sanctions available under business opportunity laws are similar to those available under
franchise laws. Business opportunity laws, however, often require that the seller provide the pur-
chaser with a specific period of time within which to cancel the agreement. See, e.g., CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1812.209(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (three business days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523B.6
(West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (three business days); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.819(1) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1987 & Supp. 1992) (thirty calendar days); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1334.05 (An-
derson 1979 & Supp. 1992) (five business days); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.110.110(4)(d)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (seven business days).
42. This requirement of a bond or trust, before business opportunities may be offered for
sale, typically is the most costly feature of business opportunity laws. In some states, the amount
of the bond or trust account can be so excessive as to preclude the sale of business opportunities.
See, e.g., CAL. Cv. CODE § 1812.214(b)(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (the lesser of $300,000 or
the total amount of the initial payments from all of the previous years' business opportunity sales);
GA. CODE ANr. § 10-1-412(a) (1990 & Supp. 1992) (at least $75,000); Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 4695 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (at least $30,000). Other statutory provisions, however,
may limit the bond or trust account requirement to situations when the seller represents that the
initial payment by the purchaser of the business opportunity is secured. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
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in numerous practices specifically related to the sale of goods to business
opportunity purchasers.43 Some statutes, for example, make it illegal to
accept money for goods that will not be delivered within a short,
state-specified time period" or, more generally, will not be delivered in a
"timely manner."' Under certain circumstances, these statutes may also
permit the purchaser to void the contract and receive a refund up to one year
after the contract's execution.4 6
Even if all of the statutory elements necessary to create either a
franchise or a business opportunity are present, the parties making such an
arrangement may not know about legislative characterizations of their rela-
tionship or the legal consequences thereof. The parties' failure to classify
properly a business venture may prove insignificant.47 On the other hand, it
could lead to grave consequences for the seller of a business venture." To
§ 1812.204(C) (West 1985); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 367.815(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4695 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 59-1728
(1988). Alternatively, the agreement does not contain a seller's buy-back option. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-505 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-412(b) (1990 &
Supp. 1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 59-1728 (1988).
43. Zeidman et al., supra note 40, at A-83 to A-84. In contrast, the prohibitions imposed by
the franchise statutes are more general in nature.
44. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1334.03(f) (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1992) (two-week
period).
45. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-5(20) (1984) ("within the time presented").
46. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.215(A) (West 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-100(A)
(1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-261 (Michie 1992).
47. Many state and federal laws apply equally to both relationships. Lambert & Miller,
supra note 26, at 4. State legislatures also have identified certain business relationships that are
exempt from statutory coverage. Such exemptions usually apply to business relationships subject
to other kinds of state regulation (e.g., securities laws) or considered inherently less subject to
abuse (e.g., sale of an ongoing business). Most franchise or business opportunity statutes provide
some exemptions. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODa § 31101 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993) (stating that
the exemption applies to franchisors having conducted the franchise business for at least five
years, or having at least 25 franchises; additionally, the franchisor must have a net worth of at
least $5 million); HAw. Rav. STAT. § 482E-4(a)(5) (1992) (providing that renewals and extensions
of existing franchise agreements are exempt).
48. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 443 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (enjoining the seller
of a business venture from terminating a distributor; the seller thereby discovered that it had
accidentally created a franchise).
A recent case illustrates how an entity, one not in the business of selling business ventures,
may still fall within the requirements of business opportunity statutes. In Eye Assocs., P.C. v.
Incomrx Sys., Ltd., 912 F.2d 23 (2d Cit. 1990), the parties had agreed that Incomrx would provide
a debt recovery service system intended to analyze Eye Associates' medical business records. Id.
at 25. Incomrx would ascertain what bills were outstanding and who was the appropriate payor.
Id. In return, Eye Associates agreed to pay Incomrx one-half of all sums collected through the
recovery program. Id. Eye Associates later refused to make payments. Id. It contended that the
agreement constituted a business opportunity within the meaning of the Connecticut Business
Opportunity Investment Act, CoNN4. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-503 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990), and
that Incomrx had failed to meet many of the Act's requirements, i.e., registration, disclosure, bond
security, appointment of attorney and fee requirements. 912 F.2d at 25. Thus, the agreement was
invalid. Id.
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be safe, the seller must navigate the intricate maze that business venture
statutes create. This maze becomes even more confusing-indeed, poten-
tially treacherous to a seller's legal and business interests-for the seller
who lacks knowledge of the administrative policies and practices of state
and federal franchise regulators.49
The conservative course of action is to treat a franchise offering and a
business opportunity in the same manner. Unless the state statute specifi-
cally excludes a franchise arrangement from the business opportunity ven-
ture statute, or a business opportunity from the franchise statute, the
cautious owner, manager, or legal advisor will strictly comply with both
statutes.50
B. The Nature of the Franchise Relationship
The term "franchise" is typically used to denote a significantly more
sophisticated business relationship than a "mere" business opportunity.51
Franchises can be divided into two categories. In "business format" or
"package" franchising, the franchisor provides the franchisee with a busi-
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the seller of a business opportunity is not
required to have solicited business from the purchaser for a business opportunity to exist. Id. at
26. Therefore, under the court's reasoning, a mutually beneficial business relationship initiated by
a purchaser will not exempt a seller from the Act's coverage. Id. Indeed, the court's holding
suggests that even a single sale of a business venture may be enough to bring a seller within the
Act's reach. Id.
49. It is often only through experience, or-more commonly-hiring experts in law and ac-
counting, that a seller obtains the necessary familiarity with the many interpretative opinions and
releases in this area. See Zeidman et al., supra note 40, at A-85; see also Instructional Sys., Inc, v.
Computer Curriculum Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 10,119 (N.J. Oct. 19, 1992) (provid-
ing extensive analysis to find that an arrangement was a franchise); STAFF OF HousE CoMMrrr
oN SMALL BUsnEss, 101ST CONG., 2 D SEss., FRANCHISING IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: PROSPEcTS
AND PROBLEMS 28-29 (Comm. Print 1990) (finding that "[c]onsiderable inconsistency also exists
in state agency interpretation, evaluation and implementation of [franchising's] common statutory
requirements and procedures," and that even different regulators within the same agency often
treat quite differently the same or similar contractual provisions and corresponding UFOC materi-
als); Lambert & Miller, supra note 26, at 5-6 (discussing Washington state, Hawaii, and FTC
administrative proceedings on businesses that met the definition of a franchise relationship, yet
failed to register as such).
50. See generally Thomas M. Pitegoff, Ways to Avoid Being a Franchise, 12 FRANcHIsE L.J.
67 passim (1992) (discussing methods of avoiding the FTC Rule and state franchising laws, but
concluding that full compliance with disclosure and registration requirements often is the most
sensible policy even when a business could opt for avoidance).
51. For a definition of franchising, see supra note 1. For an extensive analysis of the basic
question whether a business offering constitutes a franchise for purposes of state law, see Lambert
& Miller, supra note 26, passim. See generally Martin D. Fern, The Overbroad Scope of
Franchise Regulation: A Definitional Dilemma, 34 Bus. LAW. 1387, 1389-97 (1979) (describing
the "uniform business plan" and "community of interest" approaches); Stanley K. Okawachi, Fed-
eral Franchise Regulation: A Definitional Dilemma, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. Rav. 813 passim (1980)
(analyzing the scope of the definition of franchise in the Federal Trade Commission's first
franchise regulation).
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ness format, or total package, for operating a business. 2 This type of ar-
rangement ordinarily involves a franchisee who is responsible for operating
the business, but is required to sell goods or services supplied by the
franchisor or otherwise produced in accord with the franchisor's specifica-
tions.5 3  Examples of business format franchises include convenience
stores, fast-food restaurants, hotels, hair styling salons, and employment
agencies.5 4 Franchises can also exist in the form of a product or service
distribution arrangement in which the franchisee/dealer is identified with
the franchisor/supplier of the goods or services. 5  Examples of this type of
franchise include gasoline stations, motor vehicle dealerships, farm equip-
ment distributors, and soft drink bottlers.56
In their attempts to define the parameters of the franchising relation-
ship, courts and commentators have used legal analogy and economic anal-
ysis.5 7 Approaches range from pure "freedom of contract" theories,
generously laced with old-fashioned caveat emptor rhetoric, to one-sided
fiduciary obligations based on evolving notions of equity and good faith.5
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING N THE ECONOMY 1986-1988 3 (1988); Fi-
nal Guides to the Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures Trade Regulation Rule, 44 Fed.
Reg. 49,966 (1979).
53. Zeidman et al., supra note 40, at A-5.
54. See U.S. DEP"T OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 3-4; Lambert & Miller, supra note 26, at
3.
55. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMmCE, supra note 52, at 1.
56. Id.; accord Lambert & Miller, supra note 26, at 3; see also Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice
Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1982) (reiterating and expanding on the distinction
between two kinds of franchising systems-the business format system and the distribution sys-
tem); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and Consumers' Beliefs about "Tied" Products: The
Death Knellfor Krehl? 45 U. FLA. L. REv. 1163 passim (1993) (criticizing a court-created dis-
tinction, for antitrust tying purposes, between distribution and business format franchises on the
basis of consumers' supposed beliefs about the products sold at those franchises). Soft drink
bottlers may be placed in a third category: production franchises. See BRYCE WEBSTER, THE
INsmER'S GUmE TO FRANCISING 6-7 (1986) ('he industry most often associated with franchis-
ing as a method of manufacturing is the soft drink industry. Each local or regional bottling plant
is a franchisee licensed [to produce drinks from] the concentrates and associated products [sold
to it by the franchisor, e.g., Coca-Cola. The franchisee bottlers] mix the concentrates with other
ingredients, largely soda water, and bottle or 'can' the beverage for distribution to retail dealers.")
(emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 880-84 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding
fiduciary duties owed by the franchisor to the franchisee); In re Sbarro Holding, Inc., 445
N.Y.S.2d 911, 913-914 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aft'd, 456 N.Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that
the franchisor was a fiduciary-a relationship "which many authorities have accepted as typical of
the franchisor/franchisee association"); Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising
and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REv. 927, 932 (1990) (applying economic
analysis to contend that franchising relationships typically lie between employer-employee rela-
tionships and independent contracting).
58. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 860 F.2d 1341, 1349 n.4, 1352 (6th Cir.
1988) (deciding that there was no fiduciary or confidential relation between the parties to a
franchise agreement-citing 19 cases-asserting that "[tihis observation is in accordance with
the vast majority of the courts"); Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 47 (8th Cir. 1982)
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Although the basis and scope of the relationship is situational, properly de-
fining its nature would generally clarify and otherwise improve franchise
law.59 Understanding the nature of the relationship would assist courts that
face the difficult task of resolving disputes about franchise contracts that are
usually incomplete when limited to their written form.60  Perhaps even
more important, delineating the nature of each franchise contract term could
heighten each party's awareness of its legal rights and duties as a franchisor
or franchisee.
C. The Fiduciary Obligation
Some courts and commentators have argued that the franchise contract
involves a fiduciary relationship6' between the franchisor and the fran-
chisee.6 2 The fiduciary's duties consist of more than fairness and honesty;
they include.an obligation to act in furtherance of the beneficiary's best
(finding no evidence of a fiduciary relationship between a gas dealer and the manufacturer); Ar-
nott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 880-84 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding a fiduciary relationship),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543, 548-49 (S.D.
Fla. 1991) (holding that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that extends
beyond the written franchise agreement); C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 8378, at 15,341 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 1985) (finding no fiduciary relationship be-
tween a wine manufacturer and its distributor, but distinguishing a case finding a fiduciary status
between franchisor and franchisee); In re Sbarro Holding, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (Sup. Ct.
1981) (concluding that a "linkage between the parties was one of trust on one side [franchisee]
and superiority on the other [franchisor]," resulting in a relationship "awesome" in terms of the
parties' disparity in both knowledge and power), affd, 456 N.Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div. 1982); see
also Ernest A. Braun, Policy Issues of Franchising, 14 Sw. U. L. Rav. 156, 229-31, 230 n.293
(1984) (noting that courts have almost uniformly rejected the notion of a fiduciary franchising
relationship).
59. Because legislatures often differ about which relationships to regulate, which key ele-
ments will define the relationship, and which relationships should be exempt, a lack of uniformity
has arisen among the various state statutes. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
The task of determining coverage under the various state laws is formidable, owing not only
to the statutory maze, but also to the large body of regulations, advisory opinions, and informal
administrative practices used to interpret these statutory provisions. Zeidman et al., supra note 40,
at A-85.
60. See Hadfield, supra note 57.
61. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 625-26 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that a fiduciary duty "is
the highest standard of duty implied by law" that "arises whenever confidence [or trust] is re-
posed on one side, and domination and influence result on the other"; the duty prohibits fiducia-
ries from engaging in "business shrewdness, hard bargaining, and astuteness to take advantage of
the [dependent party]").
62. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 918 (1980) (holding that the franchisor owed fiduciary duties to the franchisee); Harold
Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TFx. L. RE. 650, 663-75 (1971) (contending
that the treatment of franchisors as fiduciaries would prevent many of the abuses found in, and
potential abuses inherent to, most franchising arrangements).
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interests.63 At its most basic level, this means that the fiduciary must avoid
placing its own interests in conflict with the beneficiary's interests.' Of
special significance to franchisor and franchisee is that, while analysis of an
allegedly fiduciary status between two contracting businesses includes re-
viewing the contract's express terms, the parties' manifest intent does not
control their mutual obligations, as it generally would under common-law
contract analysis.65
For courts to find a fiduciary obligation with regard to a franchise
agreement, each of the following characteristics should be present: (1) The
franchisee reasonably believes that it is purchasing, as part of the franchise,
franchisor expertise; 66 (2) the franchisor clearly dominates and has superior
knowledge and bargaining power over the franchisee;67 (3) the agreement
(or at least the clause in question) is incomplete or otherwise necessitates
great flexibility in its enforcement;68 and (4) absent some external motive,
the interests of franchisor and franchisee are the same.69
When typical franchise clauses reflect these characteristics, then the
relationship, with respect to those clauses, should be considered fiduciary.
Examples of such clauses include site selection, physical layout, training,
operational standards, manuals, financing, and advertising requirements.
For each such clause, the franchisee is relying on the franchisor for exper-
63. Fiduciary obligations originated in the courts of equity. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879, 880-85; L.S. Sealy, Some
Principles of Fiduciary Obligation, 1963 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 119, 123-26.
64. See DeMott, supra note 63, at 128-31.
65. Id. at 882 (explaining the development and current meaning of the fiduciary relationship).
66. Brown, supra note 5, at 28 (stating that franchisees purchase the franchisor's
"know-how" and are otherwise induced by the franchisor to trust in the franchisor's skills).
Franchise attorneys have described the situation as follows:
While the classic dependence on a superior party may not exist in every franchise rela-
tionship, its absence is more the exception than the norm. The start of most franchise
relationships is marked by a dependency on the franchisor to participate integrally in the
start-up of the franchise business. In many cases this can involve complete dependency,
as in the case of the turnkey franchise. Even after the relationship's initial stages, ongo-
ing supervision, advertising and other franchisor services, as well as responsibilities for
policing licensed trademarks, serve to maintain the franchisor's involvement in the
franchise business and perpetuate the franchisee's dependency on such continued
involvement.
Rochelle Buchsbaum Spandorf et al., Implications of the Covenant of Good Faith: Its Extension to
Franchising, FRANCHISE L.J., Fall 1985, at 3, 5 (1985).
67. One commentator suggests that the franchisor's superiority as "the institutional ruler of
the franchise system" is indisputable. Braun, supra note 58, at 226.
68. Hadfield, supra note 57, at 991-92.
69. An example of equivalent interests is the business premises' appearance and function.
Interests of the parties would not be the same, however, if the franchisor was motivated by oppor-
tunism, see infra note 119, and was trying to require additional investments just for the sake of
achieving a stronger, leveraged position over the franchisee.
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tise.7° As a result, the franchisor is in a position to take advantage of the
franchisee because these clauses are usually incomplete or open-ended.7'
70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71. The following are somewhat typical clauses in current franchise agreements for restau-
rants or ice cream stores. Each affords wide latitude to the franchisor in establishing or modifying
the duties and rights of the franchisee.
Training
Franchisee agrees that it is necessary to the continued operation of the System and
the Restaurant that Franchisee, Franchisee's General Manager and Secondary Managers,
and Restaurant personnel of Franchisee receive such training as specified in the
[Franchisor's Operating] Manuals or as Franchisor may require.
Southwest Cafes, Inc. Franchise Agreement (El Chico), Aug. 6, 1992, at 25, § X (emphasis added)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Site Selection
Licensor [franchisor] shall furnish to Developer (franchisee] ... such site selec-
tion counseling and assistance as Licensor may deem advisable.
Cucos Inc. Development Agreement, Sept. 27, 1991, at 3, § V, para. A, part 1 (emphasis added)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
[Franchisor] makes no guarantees concerning the success of the Store located on
any site consented to by [Franchisor].
Dairy Queen Operating Agreement, February 1992, at 5, § 5, para. A (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
Standards of Quality and Operating Manuals
In order to protect the Franchise System and to maintain uniform standards of oper-
ation under the Licensed Rights, Franchisee shall operate the Store in accordance with
the Manual, a numbered copy of which the Franchisee acknowledges having received on
loan from Franchisor .... Franchisee understands and acknowledges that Franchisor
may, from time to time, revise the contents of the Manual to implement, among other
things, new or different operating requirements applicable to all Freshens Premium Yo-
gurt stores ... and Franchisee expressly agrees to comply with each changed require-
ment within such reasonable time as Franchisor may require.
Yogurt Ventures U.S.A., Inc. Standard Franchise Agreement, Fall 1992, at 10 (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
Franchisee shall use only such food products and ingredients.., and methods of
operation and service as conform to the standards and specifications of Franchisor in
effect from time to time. Franchisee shall discontinue selling or offering for sale from
the Store any products Franchisor may, in its discretion, disapprove in writing at any
time.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Licensor [franchisor] shall, as it deems advisable, continue its efforts to maintain
high standards of quality, cleanliness, appearance and service of the System, and to that
end shall . . . [on request] disseminate Licensor's standards and specifications for
non-secret items to Licensee [franchisee].
Cucos Inc. License Agreement, at 2-3 (emphasis added) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
Physical Layout
[T]he store.., will be erected in accordance with Carvel designs or will be altered
in accordance with the now current Carvel plans and specifications.... All equipment
installed in this Carvel Store shall be in accordance with Carvel specifications ... [and]
the Licensee [franchisee] shall have no right to make any changes or alterations in said
Carvel Store, not first authorized in writing by Carvel.
Carvel Retail Manufacturer's License Agreement, June 30, 1992, at 2) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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In addition, both the franchisee and the franchisor have common interests;
for instance, both want appropriate training for franchisees, suitable busi-
ness sites, high standards of quality, helpful operating manuals, and an in-
telligent design or layout for the business premises.
In Arnott v. American Oil Co.,7  the Eighth Circuit' Court of Appeals
stated that "inherent in a franchise relationship is a fiduciary duty" running
from the franchisor to the franchisee.73 While the dissent argued that the
same pro-franchisee, anti-termination result could be reached by finding a
cause of action for fraud,74 the court cited the surge in general franchise
legislation during the 1970s, which, among other things, barred termination
or nonrenewals without good cause. The Eighth Circuit held that this legis-
lative trend supported the notion that franchisors are fiduciaries.75
Many courts have disagreed with the Arnott ruling.76 Indeed, three
years after its decision in Arnott, the Eighth Circuit found that it was "un-
Franchisee must independently obtain any architectural, engineering, and design
services it deems necessary for the construction [remodelling, or leasing] of the Restau-
rant at its own expense. Franchisee shall utilize or adapt, for Restaurant premises re-
quiring remodelling or renovation, the prototype architectural and design plans and
specifications for construction of the Restaurant provided to Franchisee by Franchisor
... and shall submit any such adapted plans to Franchisor for review. If Franchisor
determines, in its sole discretion, that any such plans are not consistent with the best
interests of the System, Franchisor shall have the right to prohibit the implementation of
such plans.
Southwest Cafes, Inc. Franchise Agreement (El Chico), Aug. 6, 1992, at 15-16 (emphasis added)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
72. 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
73. Id. at 881. In Arnott, the franchisee-plaintiff operated a gas station leased by the
franchisor-defendant. The franchisee alleged that the franchisor terminated the lease without good
cause and in bad faith. Id. at 880. The franchisee's failure to remain open 24 hours a day, which
was the franchisor's supposed basis for termination, id. at 879, was excused by the trial court; it
found that the franchisor had failed to provide enough products for the franchisee to maintain a
24-hour schedule. Id. at 884.
The Arnott court instructed the jury that a fiduciary relationship existed, and the jury found
that the franchisor had breached its fiduciary duties. Id. at 873, 881. The trial record indicated
that the franchisor had violated several provisions in its own statement of policy on franchisees'
rights. Id. at 878-80.
74. Id. at 889 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 883.
76. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Cardinal Oil Co., 535 F. Supp. 661,666-67 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(arguing that franchising parties are in a business relationship; specifically rejecting Arnott's find-
ing of a fiduciary duty); Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858,
869 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that franchisors and franchisees have a business relationship and that
the purported fiduciary duty in Arnott was merely a "duty of good faith and fair dealing"); accord
Boat & Motor Mart v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 825 F.2d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 1987); Vaughn v.
General Foods Corp., 797 F.2d 1403, 1414 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1087 (1989);
Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying
Louisiana law); Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43,48 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying South
Dakota law); Carter Equip. Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 681 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.
1982) (applying Mississippi law); Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 354-355 (7th
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necessary" for the Arnott decision to have labeled the duty of "good faith
and fair dealing" as "fiduciary.17 7 While this Article maintains that some
clauses in a franchise contract merit the imposition of fiduciary duties,78
characterizing the entire relationship as fiduciary in nature sometimes
would produce harsh results. For instance, the strict imposition of an over-
all fiduciary obligation would require the franchisor to put the interests of
the franchisee ahead of its own, even when a particular aspect of the
franchising arrangement is actually adversarial. It may even be against the
long-term interests of franchisees to impose a fiduciary relationship in cer-
tain aspects of the franchisor-franchisee relationship.79
D. Strict Interpretation of Express Contracts
Many states now regulate franchising. 0 This regulation seems to re-
flect legislative and administrative recognition of an imbalance in the rela-
tionship, with franchisors enjoying strong, potentially abusive, bargaining
leverage over the franchisees.8" Still, some courts adopt a somewhat doctri-
Cir. 1982) (applying Wisconsin law); MAACO Enters., Inc. v. Cross, No. CIV.A.92-4688, 1992
WL 30677, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1992) (unpublished opinion); Pizza Management, Inc. v.
Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1154, 1183 (D. Kan. 1990); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 696 F. Supp. 57, 74-75 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd, 988 F.2d 386 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
289 (1993); Premiere Wine & Spirits of South Dakota v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431,
1435 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aft'd, 846 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1988); General Bus. Mach. v. National Semi-
conductor Datachecker/DTS, 664 F. Supp. 1422, 1425-1426 (D. Utah 1987); Morse v. Gibraltar
Transmission Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788-E, 1986 WL 15618, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1986)
(unpublished opinion); Power Motive Corp. v. Mannesmann Demag Co., 617 F. Supp. 1048,
1051-1052 (D. Colo. 1985) (applying Ohio law); Schaeffer v. Collins, No. CIV.A.80-2797, 1980
WL 1965, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1980); Newark Motor Inn Corp. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 472 F.
Supp. 1143, 1151-53 (D. N.J. 1979); Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l,
Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1047, 1053-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v, Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992); Braun, supra note 58, at 230 & n.293.
77. Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982).
78. See infra notes 121-81 and accompanying text; see also Crim Truck & Tractor Co., 823
S.W.2d at 597-602 (Mauzy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a special, confidential, fiduciary relation-
ship existed between the franchisor and franchisee in that particular case); Anne L. Austin, Com-
ment, When Does a Franchisor Become a Fiduciary? Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar
International Transportation Corporation, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1151, 1170-74 (1993) (argu-
ing that the Texas Supreme Court should have found a confidential relationship justifying the
imposition of a fiduciary duty upon the franchisor, "even though under ordinary circumstances the
franchise relationship is a business relationship, governed by contract, and nothing more").
79. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 893 (8th Cir. 1979) (Bright, J.,
dissenting) (contending that to limit the franchisor's power of termination "invites wholesale sup-
pliers to replace their lessees and distributors with.., employees whose freedom of action would
be considerably more restricted"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980). Long-term, the encourage-
ment of vertical integration over contractual arrangements between independent parties is likely to
diminish the role of franchising and thus decrease the opportunities for franchisees or would-be
franchisees.
80. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 1509-12; supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
81. Emerson, supra note 1, at 1511. In an attempt to remedy business venture sales abuse,
several states attempted to place the sale of a business venture within the definition of security.
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naire approach to franchise contractual clauses. These courts rely on the
sanctity of contract and infer no special relationship between the franchisor
and the franchisee.8" For instance, in O'Neal v. Burger Chef Systems,
Inc.,83 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the vast majority of
courts have found no fiduciary aspect to the franchise relationship. 84 The
O'Neal court rejected the argument that the franchisor had a duty to dis-
close to franchisees the sale of the corporate franchisor to another
franchisor in the same industry. According to the court, there were no
provisions, express or implied, that suggested the franchisor's interest
Braun, supra note 58, at 194-95. Some commentators contended that the federal securities laws
could, and should, cover the sale of franchises. See Bernard Goodwin, Franchising in the Econ-
omy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Security Acts, Including 10b-5 Considera-
tions, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311, 1319-20 (1969). But see Michael M. Coleman, A Franchise
Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW 493, 508 (1967).
Most courts, however, were unwilling to adopt the "franchise as security" arguments. See,
e.g., Fox v. Ehrmantraut, 615 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Cal. 1980) (holding that sale of stock in a licensee
company, as part of the sale of an ongoing business, was exempt from securities laws); Polikoff v.
Levy, 204 N.E.2d 807, 810 (111. App. Ct.) (holding that sale of interest in land upon which a motel
was to be built was not the sale of a "security" but was a joint venture), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903
(1965); Braun, supra note 58, at 196. This reluctance was effectively bolstered by federal regula-
tion and state legislation during the 1970s that was directed specifically at franchising's supposed
problems and thus appeared to make unnecessary the use of securities laws as a means of regulat-
ing franchise ventures. Id.
Another tactic has been for allegedly defrauded purchasers to invoke antitrust principles in a
search for effective relief from business opportunity sales abuses. However, in the past few de-
cades, successful private actions have become uncommon. See generally Symposium,
Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships-Antitrust Considerations, 47 ANITRmuST L.J. 869, 880-98
(1978) (discussing ways in which antitrust law has been applied in franchise settings); Emerson,
supra note 1, at 1562 (discussing the reduction in enforcement of antitrust violations).
Eventually, states focused on disclosure concepts borrowed from securities statutes and en-
acted business opportunity and franchising laws to prevent seller abuses. Disclosure regulations
require the seller to reveal material facts about the business venture so the purchaser can evaluate
the offering and make a knowledgeable business decision. Prior to the enactment of such statutes,
the only remedy usually available to a defrauded purchaser was a common-law action for breach
of contract or fraud. Sandra M. Bourbon, Note, The Georgia Sale of Business Opportunities Act,
1 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 219, 222 (1985). Often these remedies were not very helpful, particularly if
the seller had become insolvent or disappeared with the purchaser's money. Id.
82. To paraphrase Dragnet's Sergeant Joe Friday, this view may simply be, "Just the facts in
the contract, Ma'am."
83. 860 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1988).
84. Id. at 1349. The O'Neal court cited 19 court opinions, which were from three other
federal courts of appeals (the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits), 12 different federal district
courts, and the highest state appellate courts in New York and Oregon. See also Braun, supra
note 58, at 230 (citing numerous cases for the conclusion that "[t]he greater number of jurisdic-
tions have ... rejected a proposed characterization of the franchise relationship as a fiduciary
relationship"). These and other courts relied on fundamental contract principles and concluded
that there is nothing fiduciary in nature about the franchise because, among other things, each
party to it has an independent interest in its own profits.
85. O'Neal, 860 F.2d at 1350.
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would remain static.86 Therefore, relying specifically on express contrac-
tual terms and refusing to recognize any special relationship outside of con-
tract, the court reasoned that the identity of the franchisor's corporate parent
was not part of the subject matter of the contract.17
The O'Neal court proceeded no further with its analysis. Basic con-
tract law sufficed, as the court failed to consider how different clauses in a
franchise agreement may deserve varying standards of interpretation. The
author recommends that only certain types of franchise agreement clauses
be interpreted in accord with a constricted, literalistic approach comparable
to that used in O'Neal. To classify a clause as one deserving merely a
contractual relationship, the following characteristics should exist: (1) any
bargaining on that clause ended before or upon the issuance of the
franchise; 88 (2) the clause is complete, is definite, and can be enforced with-
out requiring interpretation or "flexibility" depending on the circumstances;
(3) the clause creates no reasonable expectation of franchisor assistance to
the franchisee; and (4) with respect to the terms of the clause, the rightful
interests of franchisor and franchisee are adverse. This four-part standard
could be adopted via legislation or judicial holding.
Examples of these strict contractual clauses might include initial
franchise fees, royalties, other payments, the duration of the franchise, arbi-
tration and venue stipulations, insurance requirements, and declarations
about intellectual property ownership. The parties normally agree to these
unambiguous, nondiscretionary terms at the outset of the franchise relation-
ship. For these terms, a reasonable franchisee would not be at a disadvan-
tage or have to look to the franchisor for advice or other guidance; the
parties presumably negotiate at arm's length.89 Note that even "strict" con-
tract law still allows for some implied protection of a presumably weak
franchisee.90
86. Id. at 1352. In fact, the author's survey of 100 franchise agreements reveals that 66%
expressly state that the franchisor has a right to assign the agreement, while 93% expressly deny
such an uninhibited right of transfer to the franchisee. Infra app. § B-3-a-2, B-3-b.
87. O'Neal, 860 F.2d at 1352. Therefore, the sale of the corporate franchise presented the
franchisees with no cause of action.
88. In other words, the clause is not in flux as part of the dynamic, ongoing relationship
between the franchisor and franchisee.
89. When the agreement is silent about a particular matter, courts still could find covenants
of good faith and fair dealing in an effort to preserve the spirit of the contract and the justifiable
expectations of the parties. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
90. The resulting implied rights or duties perhaps originate in public policy concerns as much
as from any reading between the lines of a particular franchise agreement. Obviously, to find such
implied protection requires that there be no contrary express provisions in the franchise contract.
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E. Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Under the common law as presently developed, courts may infer that
all contracts contain covenants of good faith and fair dealing.91 When a
franchisee sues a franchisor for breach of contract, the franchisee has the
burden of proof to show that the franchisor acted in bad faith. While these
covenants cannot override a franchise agreement's express provisions,92
they can assist courts in interpreting the parties' intentions when the agree-
ment is silent about a particular issue. Therefore, unlike the O'Neal court,
which ended its analysis after finding nothing in the contract expressly on
point,93 many courts have refused to let the franchisor do as it wished. In
the 1991 case of Scheck v. Burger King Corp.,9 4 for example, the court
permitted the franchisee to go to trial on its claim that the franchisor had
breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by opening
another franchised restaurant just two miles away from the franchisee's lo-
cation.95 The court recognized that a contract includes not only its written
provisions, but also terms and matters that are implied at law.96 According
to the court, although the franchise contract explicitly denied the franchisee
any territorial rights, the franchisor had no right to open additional
franchises without taking into account their effect on the nearby fran-
chisee.97 According to the court, the implied covenant of good faith and
91. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Minerva, Inc., 956 F.2d 1566, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1992).
92. See, e.g., Devery Implement Co. v. J.I. Case Co., 944 F.2d 724, 728 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be applied "so as to write
the termination-at-will provision out of" a franchise contract); UNrm. FRANCHISE AND BUSINESS
OPPORTUNIIss Acr § 201 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. 118 (Supp. 1993) (stating that a franchise agreement
"imposes on the parties a duty of good faith in its performance and enforcement," but limiting the
duty to those instances in which it would not "add to or override substantive provisions of a
[franchise] contract"); accord Flint Davis v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 873 F.2d 888, 894 (6th Cir.
1989); Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d 934, 938 (6th Cir. 1989) (restricting
the good faith standard to only those cases in which a party acted in bad faith while negotiating
the original franchise agreement, not simply cases involving alleged, subsequent bad faith); Ro-
senberg v. Pillsbury Co., 718 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see B.P.G. Autoland
Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (D. Mass. 1991) (concluding
that the franchisor's prior failure to enforce certain credit provisions meant that its sudden with-
drawal of the franchisee's inventory financing may have breached an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, even though the written agreement between the parties expressly permitted
such an abrupt withdrawal).
93. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
94. 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
95. Id. at 545. The court granted summary judgment to the franchisor on all other theories
advanced by the franchisee: breach of (1) an implied contract created by promissory estoppel, (2)
an implied non-competition agreement, and (3) the duty established by the Massachusetts Con-
sumer Protection Act. Id. at 545, 550.
96. Id. at 548-49.
97. Id. at 549. This same reasoning was adopted in Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 798 F.
Supp. 684, 689 (S.D. Fla. 1992), in which the court noted that just because the franchise agree-
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fair dealing entitles a franchisee to expect the franchisor to refrain from
destroying the franchisee's ability to "enjoy the fruits of the contract."98
F. Affirmative Showing of Good Cause
Decisions such as Scheck draw from contract law and find no special
relationship beyond implied covenants between franchisor and franchisee. 99
In contrast, Arnott v. American Oil Company suggests that a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists: it requires the franchisor to meet the highest standard of
care and act in the franchisee's best interest."0 °
Other courts take the middle ground-franchisors must make an af-
firmative showing of "good cause" before terminating or otherwise affect-
ing a franchise.' Although this standard is more protective of franchisees
than the common law of contract, it is far short of a fiduciary relationship.
The good cause requirement does not force the franchisor to put its fran-
chisees' interests ahead of its own;10 2 however, it does require that even in
the presence of an express contractual term to the contrary, "good cause"
must be demonstrated to validate a franchisor's actions. The mere absence
of bad faith is thus an insufficient basis for "good cause" court decisions
that would favor the franchisor.
ment failed to grant the franchisee an exclusive area or other express area rights, it did not some-
how authorize the franchisor to place additional, competing franchises on any site it wanted.
98. Scheck, 756 F. Supp. at 549; see also Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704,
728 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that the implied covenant of good faith "prohibit[s] actions ... that
would preclude profitable operation of the franchise or coerce franchise owners to terminate their
agreements on terms favorable to [the franchisor]"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Burton,
supra note 14, at 373 (contending that good faith consists of actions within the reasonable contem-
plation of the parties when the contract was formed, while it is bad faith when a party exercises its
discretion to recapture opportunities foregone upon contracting); Spandorf et al., supra note 66, at
6 (stating that "the good faith covenant requires that each party act in a manner consistent with the
contract's purpose," and-since economic profit is the main reason for entering a franchise con-
tract-a franchisor should not take any "action that precludes profitable operation of a franchise").
99. Scheck, 756 F. Supp. at 548-49; accord O'Neal v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 860 F.2d 1341,
1350 (6th Cir. 1988).
100. Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979) (opining that this fiduci-
ary duty remains even if there appear to be contrary, express contract terms), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 918 (1980).
101. Some courts have adopted this intermediate standard for termination cases. Even if there
is an express contractual provision about termination, these courts require the franchisor to show
good cause before terminating the franchise. See, e.g., P & W Supply Co. v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 747 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (N.D. I11. 1990) (concluding that an implied covenant
effectively overturns the express language of the contract which allows termination without good
cause); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (finding good cause
for termination because franchisee failed to maintain quality, service, and cleanliness standards);
Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 602 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); see
also infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Marinello court's requiring, but
not finding, evidence of good cause for termination).
102. That is, it does not mandate a fiduciary relationship.
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In Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,10 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
sidered whether "good cause" should be required despite an express clause
in the franchise agreement giving the franchisor a right to terminate almost
at will.""° The plaintiff-franchisee in Marinello leased a gas station from
the defendant-franchisor for a three-year term with year-to-year renewals
thereafter.'05 Either the franchisee or the franchisor could terminate the
lease so long as the prescribed advance notice was given.'0 6 The franchisor
gave notice of termination pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement.'0 7
The franchisee immediately sued to enjoin the proposed termination and
reform the agreement.' 0 8
Ultimately, New Jersey's Supreme Court agreed with the trial court
that good cause is a prerequisite for termination.' 09 The Marinello court
concluded that the franchisor's bargaining power was so disproportionate
that to allow termination without good cause would violate state public
policy. 10
Many courts have cited Marinello with approval."' Also, numerous
state statutes now require "good cause" for franchisors to terminate a
franchise. 12 The same policy reasons for having a "good cause" termina-
tion standard applies to a franchisor's use of certain other franchise agree-
ment provisions. These include provisions about territorial development
and protection, covenants against competition, franchise transfers,
franchisor assignments, franchise non-renewals, prices, supplies, business
hours, franchisee employees, inspections, and auditing." '3 In each of these
103. 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973).
104. Id. at 602.
105. Id. at 599.
106. Id. at 600 (stating that 90 days' notice was necessary for termination at any time; only 30




110. The court had decided that New Jersey's newly enacted franchise practices statute did not
retroactively apply to the Marinello termination. Nonetheless, the court found that the new statute
reflected the legislature's deep concern over abuses by franchisors, particularly in the termination
and non-renewal of franchises; as such, the statute supposedly just codified the already existing
public policy of New Jersey. Id. at 602.
111. See, e.g., Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. 594 F.2d 129, 139 (5th Cir.),
rel'g denied, 597 F.2d 772 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979); Tulowitski v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 961 (Del. 1978); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736,
742 (Pa. 1978).
112. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 1511 n.27 (listing 16 states that have good cause require-
ments for terminating franchises). In 1992, a seventeenth state, Iowa, added such a requirement
via its newly enacted franchise act. IowA CODE §§ 523H.1-523H.17 (Supp. 1993).
113. See, e.g., AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Harris, 759 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1991
(holding that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, recognized by Pennsylvania courts to
cover franchise terminations, also may extend to other areas of the franchise relationship).
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situations, the franchisee is arguably at the mercy of its franchisor, and the
franchisee's bargaining position is weakened severely by its sunk costs at
risk. The franchisee rightfully expects the franchisor not to abuse its discre-
tion when dealing with an incomplete or otherwise flexible clause that af-
fords the franchisor much discretionary power.
A "good cause" approach preserves franchisor flexibility-much more
so than under a fiduciary approach-while offering to franchisees a degree
of comfort that completely untrammelled franchisor discretion fails to al-
low. In general, contractual clauses with the following elements should
lead to the application of a "good cause" requirement in addition to the
normal contract relationship: (1) in setting or carrying out the clause's
terms, the franchisor held a superior bargaining position to that of the fran-
chisee;'1"4 (2) the clause is incomplete or otherwise naturally requires some
flexibility in interpretation or enforcement, perhaps including judicial rec-
ognition of the parties' subjective intent; and (3) the franchisee reasonably
expected that-regardless of any contrary express provision in the con-
tract-the franchisor would not abuse its discretion" 5 by invoking the
114. Spandorf et al., supra note 66, at 5-6 (noting that prospective franchisees have very little
bargaining freedom because "franchising normally involves a franchisor's presentation of a form
franchise agreement to a prospective franchisee on a 'take it or leave it' basis"); accord Harold
Brown, A Fair Dealership Law-Proposed Findings and Purpose, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 28, 1991, at 3,
7 (citing several cases for the proposition that the franchise agreement is an adhesion contract that
only offers the franchisee onerous terms on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis). While potential fran-
chisees generally have the power to decide not to enter into a contract at all, if these possible
franchisees have no genuine power over the setting of terms within a franchise contract, then it
seems fair to label their bargaining position as inferior to the franchisor with respect to the making
of that contract.
115. The Marinello court considered the franchisor's abuse of discretion to be a key concern.
307 A.2d at 601-02; see also Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Management Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 228,
232 (2d Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that the franchise agreement gave franchisor Carvel "consider-
able discretion" in and "near absolute control over" matters such as advertising, store locations,
and wholesale sales, but concluding that "even if [Carvel] acted within the bounds of its discre-
tion, Carvel would be in breach if it acted unreasonably"); Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions,
Inc., 708 F. Supp. 867, 885 (N.D. I11. 1989) (holding that "even if the express terms of the
[franchise] Agreement permitted [franchisor] AAMCO to alter its policies, it could not change
them arbitrarily"); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 972 (II1. App. Ct. 1984) (requir-
ing good cause for a franchise termination and stating that a franchisor "vested with contractual
discretion must exercise that discretion reasonably and with proper motive, and may not do so
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the
parties").
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clause. The resulting moderate approach" 6 should promote a sense of fair
play. 17
III. APPLYING THE CoRRECT STANDARD
A. Introduction
In the cases discussed above, a franchise relationship was clearly pres-
ent, but the courts were inconsistent as to what the relationship meant. This
inconsistency can be found in case law throughout the United States." 8
Franchisors and franchisees thus are left bereft of guidance about what stan-
dards of care, if any, a court may impose.
The nature of the franchise relationship must be defined so that both
franchisor and franchisee know their respective roles and can avoid disputes
about contractual clauses. When a dispute does arise, the parties' ability to
negotiate a quick and fair settlement will be greatly improved when they
116. The middle approach lies between fiduciary analysis and relatively strict common-law
contract analysis. In summation, the three approaches involve these elements:
Common Law
Fiduciary Good Cause (Arm's Length)
Franchisee Aid; franchisor No abuse of No aid; only what is
Expectations expertise franchisor power expressly in the
contract
Bargaining Process Franchisor Greater franchisor Completed by time
domination & power franchise was issued;
superior knowledge no need for ongoing
talks
Clause Completeness Incomplete or Incomplete or Definite; no
& Need for Flexible requires very flexible requires some flexibility in
Enforcement enforcement flexible enforcement enforcement needed
Interests of the Same, for that clause Not an issue Opposite, for that
Franchisor & clause
Franchisee
The elements of the fiduciary standard and the common-law approach are discussed supra notes
66-71, 88-90, and accompanying text.
117. This sense of fair play may reduce the franchisee's perceived risks and thereby increase
the value of the franchise to the franchisee. The franchisor, in turn, can charge more for this
apparently more valuable franchise. Thus, both franchisee and franchisor may benefit from this
standard.
118. See, e.g., GARNER, supra note 10, § 8:06, at 11 ("American courts have demonstrated
little consistency in applying rules of interpretation to contracts."); Rupert M. Barkoff, Franchise
Sales Regulation: A Revisionist's Approach, Remarks at the ABA's Fifth Annual Forum on
Franchising 40 (Nov. 4, 1982) (referring to excessive "inconsistency" resulting from, inter alia,
'judicial idiosyncracies"); see also J. Michael Dady, One Franchisee Lawyer's Comments on
Congressman LaFalce's Proposed Federal Franchise Legislation, 12 FRANcHmSe L.J. 14, 15
(1992) (noting that different courts hold diametrically opposed views about a franchisor's ability
to disclaim, in effect, its duties of good faith and fair dealing); Emerson, supra note 1, at 1513-16
(discussing the overall "hodgepodge" of inconsistent statutes, regulations, and case law concern-
ing franchise relationships).
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have the means to predict more accurately the likely outcome in court. On
the other hand, a failure to clarify the relationship's metes and bounds sim-
ply promotes the abuse of discretion. For instance, absent consistent appli-
cation of the proper standards of care, the superior bargaining position of
the franchisor may foster opportunism." 9
To increase certainty and attain justice, courts should hold the
franchisor to a standard of care consistent with the interests and expecta-
tions of the parties at the time of the agreement. Each franchise contract
clause should be analyzed according to the parties' rightful expectations.
Once the parties' interests and expectations for each clause are described,
then the nature of the franchise relationship, as it exists under those circum-
stances, can be identified. Such identification leads to the proper applica-
tion of standards. 120
B. Clauses Requiring a Fiduciary Relationship
Several clauses typically placed in franchise agreements should be in-
terpreted as imposing a fiduciary duty on the franchisor.1 21 This section
addresses seven clauses that appear to create a fiduciary relationship: site
selection, physical layout and signs, training of franchisees, operational
standards, variance among franchisees, opening and financing, and
advertising.
1. Site Selection
For new or relatively inexperienced franchisees, one major benefit ex-
pected from the franchising arrangement is franchisor expertise in areas
where the franchisees have limited knowledge. In site selection, for in-
stance, the franchisor is in a position to know from past franchisee perform-
ance the demographics best suited for maximum sales and profits. Both
119. Opportunism can best be described by way of example. Once the franchisee has invested
heavily in its franchise, the franchisee becomes vulnerable to the franchisor, which can exploit this
advantage (behave opportunistically) in any number of ways: increase rents, raise prices on sup-
plied goods, boost royalties via a required increase in sales volume, charge higher fees for train-
ing, marketing, or other "assistance," and other methods. The franchisee, having already invested
in the franchise with little hope of selling the invested assets for their cost, has minimal power to
object to the franchisor's price increases. Therefore, an opportunistic franchisor can extract a
significant portion of the franchisee's sunk costs. See Hadfield, supra note 57, at 951-55.
120. As examples, the franchise contract clauses most frequently found in the fast-food indus-
try will be considered. See supra note 71; infra app.
121. For a discussion of the fiduciary relationship in a franchising context see supra notes
61-79 and accompanying text. If found to exist, the fiduciary standard would place the burden of
proof on the franchisor to show that it dealt openly and fairly with the franchisee-beneficiary. See
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Moreover, the subjective intent of the fiduciary would
be irrelevant; regardless of whether the franchisor wanted what took place, the issue would be
whether the franchisor put the franchisee's interests ahead of its own. See supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 72
FRANCHISOR'S DUTY OF CARE
franchisor and franchisee should have similar interests; unless there is fraud
or other subterfuge at work, neither franchisor nor franchisee should gain by
opting for anything less than the best available site.122
Franchisors have an affirmative duty to perform, even if it simply re-
quires approval of suggested sites compiled by the franchisee.123 Because
site selection clauses require franchisor flexibility and discretion, 24 the
courts should hold franchisors to a fiduciary standard in disputes over alleg-
edly poor, delayed, or denied sites. Holding franchisors to a fiduciary stan-
dard places the burden of proof on franchisors to show that they acted in the
franchisee's best interests."25
In Tidmore Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co.,'26 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit recently considered franchise site issues. There, the plain-
tiff-franchisee, Tidmore, distributed gasoline wholesale to numerous dealers
in nine Alabama counties and retailed gasoline directly through a smaller
number of stores in the same territory. Defendant-franchisor British Petro-
leum refined petroleum products and then sold them via its own stations
and via franchisees such as Tidmore. When Tidmore requested BP's ap-
proval for a new store, BP rejected the request and failed to give any rea-
sons for the denial.' 27 Within ten months after the denial, BP approved a
marketing plan placing three new stations in the same area as that requested
by Tidmore. One of the stations was actually closer to an existing station
than the site Tidmore had proposed. 2 ' BP subsequently informed Tidmore
that it simply would not approve any sites within the area Tidmore origi-
nally requested.12
9
122. Of course, parties may differ as to what that site is. Certainly, picking the best site is far
from fool-proof. But that does not mean the parties' interests are adverse-only that reaching
their joint goals may prove difficult.
123. Given franchisor knowledge of past franchisee performance, the franchisor should not
merely accept franchisee choices if others would be better. A fiduciary duty would require
franchisor intervention on behalf of the franchisee. At any rate, commentators have concluded
that some franchisors, "[w]hether by design or not, [actually] exercise nearly complete control
over the process of selecting the site for a franchised business." Gaylen L. Knack & Troy A.
Bader, Franchisor Liability in the Market-Development and Site-Selection Process: Location, Lo-
cation... Liability?, 13 FRANCHISE L.J. 39, 42 (1993).
124. See supra note 71.
125. Almost all courts facing the issue have refused to extend fiduciary concepts to franchis-
ing agreements; thus, this approach would be new law. Although the court in Arnott v. American
Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980), identified the
franchising relationship as fiduciary, close analysis reveals nothing more than a contractual analy-
sis with perhaps an affirmative showing of good cause.
126. 932 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1991).
127. Ultimately, a BP representative allegedly told Tidmore that its proposed site was too
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment in BP's favor. Analyzing the implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing under Alabama law and determining that these covenants were di-
rective rather than remedial, the court concluded that Tidmore had failed to
proffer the necessary evidence that BP's conduct deprived Tidmore of the
benefit of its franchising contract bargain.130 The Tidmore decision focused
on the express provisions of the contract 13I rather than the expectations,
bargaining power, or overall purposes of the site selection clause. Such an
approach almost uniformly yields a pro-franchisor outcome. Franchisors,
after all, draft the contracts.1 32
The site selection provision implicated in Tidmore, which vested ulti-
mate and highly discretionary power in the franchisor, appears to be a typi-
cal clause in most franchise agreements. 133  The Tidmore court thus
essentially granted franchisors the right to disapprove sites for any reason.
A better judicial method, one taking into account the strong potential for
abuse, would incorporate an understanding of the overall franchising rela-
tionship into analysis of site selection provisions.
Other courts, in similar franchise contexts, have looked beyond the
strict interpretation of contract terms; in doing so, these courts have better
adapted their decision-making process to meet the parties' actual, legitimate
expectations when the contract was made. For example, in Scheck v. Bur-
ger King Corp.,'13 the court held that while a franchise agreement expressly
denied to the plaintiff-franchisee an exclusive territorial interest, the
franchisor's subsequent opening of other nearby franchises may have vio-
lated implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing regardless of their
effect on the plaintiff-franchisee's operations. 135 More directly on point is
130. Id. at 1391 (citing two cases holding that the implied covenants do not apply when there
are express contract terms on point: Davis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 873 F.2d 888, 895 (6th Cir.
1989) (applying Georgia law); Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873,
877-78 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Michigan law)).
131. The BP-Tidmore clause read: Site selection "[a]pproval will be based on the appear-
ance, location and mode of operation of the outlet. [Franchisor] expressly reserves the right to
determine the appropriate geographic density of... outlets." Tidmore, 932 F.2d at 1386.
132. Emerson, supra note 1, at 1509 & n.21 (citing both case law and commentary for the
related propositions that the franchisor generally drafts the agreement and that most of the explicit,
contractual obligations fall upon the franchisee).
133. Infra app. § A-I (reporting that 71% of the surveyed contracts expressly require
franchisor approval of the franchisee's business site, with 18% actually stating that the franchisor
picks the site); see also WEBsTER, supra note 56, at 99 (concluding that a typical contractual
phrase requiring a franchisor's approval of the proposed site will not be unreasonably withheld
"offers no protection to the franchisee whatever' and actually constitutes "a universal escape
hatch for the franchisor").
134. 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
135. Id. at 549 (contending that the contract's express denial to the franchisee of any exclusive
territorial rights did not mean that the franchisor was permitted "to destroy the right of the fran-
chisee to enjoy the fruits of the contract"); see also Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 798 F. Supp.
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Brennan v. Carvel Corp.136 The Brennan court refused to apply the rather
narrow wording of the franchise agreement's site selection clause. Instead,
the court referred to the prior "Application and Deposit Agreement"
("ADA") that the prospective franchisee, Brennan, had signed with Car-
vel. 137 Carvel stated in the ADA, "[A] substantial amount of time and
effort shall be exerted [by Carvel] in seeking, surveying and showing loca-
tions suitable for a Carvel store."'138 The court also found great significance
in Carvel's informational brochures and the Uniform Franchise Offering
Circular (UFOC), 139 which, like the ADA, provided that Carvel would "as-
sume responsibility for selecting, obtaining and negotiating a suitable loca-
tion for the Carvel store."' 4 ° Carvel argued that it had furnished the
promised site selection services by ensuring that the site was properly
zoned, had enough space, and contained the necessary electrical wiring and
mechanical facilities. In response, the court held that, under the circum-
stances, a "suitable site means one that is in a location which has adequate
traffic or population, or other appropriate characteristics, in which a Carvel
franchise may succeed."'' Concluding that the franchisee's failure was not
due to mismanagement or a lack of effort, the court laid the blame squarely
upon the franchisor for its failure to evaluate and select a suitable site for
the franchisee's ice cream store.' 42
684, 689 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (described supra note 97); Knack & Bader, supra note 123, at 42
(proposing that franchisors consider granting franchisees limited protected areas and, "most im-
portant, [that] franchisors should establish development policies designed to identify when a pro-
posed new unit may have a significant adverse impact on existing units").
136. 929 F.2d 801 (Ist Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 807-08. The court did so despite the merger clause found'in the subsequently
signed franchise agreement. Id. Merger clauses are found in most franchise agreements. Infra
app. § C-7 (reporting that merger clauses are present in 79% of the surveyed contracts).
A merger clause is a contractual provision that the written terms of that contract "may not be
varied by prior or oral agreements because all such agreements have been merged into the written
document." BLAcK's LAW DIcnONARY 989 (6th ed. 1990). In effect, the clause purports that the
contract is "integrated" and thus governed by the parol evidence rule. See infra note 274.
138. Brennan, 929 F.2d at 804. The ADA, in effect, contained franchisor Carvel's promise to
undertake efforts on behalf of the prospective franchisee in return for the prospective franchisee's
deposit of $1000 and promise not to disclose or use any trade secrets or other information given to
it by Carvel. Id.
139. The UFOC was adopted on September 2, 1975, by the Midwest Securities Commission-
ers Association, now the North American Securities Administrators Association. Compliance
with UFOC satisfies the FTC rule on franchising disclosures, found at 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1-436.3
(1992). Final Guides to the Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures Trade Regulation
Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966, 49,970 (1979); Statement of Basis and Purpose Relating to Disclosure
Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43
Fed. Reg. 59,621, 59,722-23 (1978).
140. Brennan, 929 F.2d at 804.
141. Id. at 809.
142. Id. at 809-10; see also Knack & Bader, supra note 123, at 44-46 (discussing TCBY v.
Paulson, No. LR-C-91-162 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 24, 1993), an unpublished case in which the jury
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2. Physical Layout and Signs
Business-format franchisees generally buy a "package" that includes a
systematized, rather uniform layout, including signs. 43 Persons who be-
come franchisees presumably expect a measure of franchisor expertise con-
cerning physical layout. 44 It also seems reasonable to assume that many
franchisors informally oversee matters of design and construction even
when the contract does not require them to do so. Their ultimate right to
approve or deny the layout certainly provides most franchisors with lever-
age in this area.
Franchisor supervision of the layout promotes efficiency and consis-
tency throughout the franchise system. The interests of franchisor and fran-
chisee are, as with site selection, quite similar.145 Franchisors ordinarily
receive no benefit from providing inadequate guidance or otherwise impos-
ing requirements not in the best interest of the franchisees. Therefore, this
clause also meets the characteristics needed to mandate fiduciary duties on
the part of the franchisor: (1) franchisee expectations of franchisor exper-
tise, (2) franchisor superiority in knowledge and bargaining power, (3) a
clause calling for substantial flexibility in its application,' 46 and (4) close
similarity in the interests of franchisor and franchisee. 47 Obviously, when
franchisors can mandate modifications of the franchised business' layout,
148
awarded $70,000 to a franchisee to whom franchisor TCBY did not provide "reasonable assist-
ance" in the site-selection process).
143. This design or display "package" may be in conjunction with the trademarks and service
marks provided by the franchisor or as part of the advertising controls. See RAYMOND J. MUNNA,
FRANCHISE SmECnoN: SEPARAING FACt FROM FxcnON 141 (1987) (describing display require-
ments and mandatory decor "as part of the [franchisor's] desire to retain or maintain a certain
public visibility and uniformity of look").
144. Obviously, this subject is important in many, probably most, franchised businesses. Of
the 100 contracts that the author reviewed, 73% provide that the franchised business premises'
layout must be approved by the franchisor, and an additional 10% call upon the franchisor itself to
implement the appropriate design layout. See infra app. § A-2.
145. While either side may have a covert interest in cheap workmanship or other cost-savers,
the overt interests-the only ones that a court and the other party generally can be expected to
recognize-are for a relatively uniform, standardized layout that takes advantage of system-wide
marketing programs, customer goodwill, and the like.
146. See, e.g., supra note 71; see also infra app. § A-2-d (reporting that 59% of surveyed
contracts give the franchisor the right to mandate future modifications of the layout, with 16%
specifically providing that any mandated modifications are entirely at the expense of the fran-
chisee). The franchisor must have flexibility, but operate with extreme fairness, when invoking
such a provision.
147. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 146.
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often entirely at the franchisee's expense, 49 then the franchisor's powers
are even stronger.
150
3. Training of Franchisees
All surveyed franchise agreements contain a clause concerning
franchisor training of the franchisee, 15 and most include special "consulta-
tion" arrangements, as well.' 52  Franchisees rightfully expect the fran-
chisor's assistance; indeed, such aid is often a significant reason why the
franchisee decided to buy a franchise.' 53 Training, uniformity of approach,
and learning from experience are all, in effect, purchased by the franchisee.
Of course, training or consultation cannot be completely specified via con-
tract, so these clauses necessitate franchisor flexibility, with the franchisor
in a position to control this aspect of the relationship.' 5 4 In essence, the
franchisor is called upon to perform a fiduciary service that should redound
to the benefit of both sides. A fiduciary duty for these provisions ought to
be inferred.
4. Operational Standards
Courts routinely uphold franchise terminations when a franchisee has
breached the franchisor's quality standards155 or otherwise failed to meet
149. See supra note 146.
150. In the 1970s, for example, many fast-food franchisees had to build drive-through win-
dows in order to comply with the franchisor's evolving concepts about each outlet's layout and its
best method for serving customers and boosting sales. Gary Taylor, Battle Ahead for Congres-
sional Franchise Bills, NAT'L L.J., June 1, 1992, at 32.
151. Infra app. § A-3 (reporting that 100% of surveyed agreements provide for franchisor
training of the franchisee; 43% expressly state that training is to be at the franchisee's expense).
152. Infra app. § A-3-c (finding that 59% of surveyed contracts provide for franchisor consult-
ing services on behalf of the franchisee). Training typically involves a well-defined program for
new franchisees and their key employees, with almost all of the activity in the early stages of a
franchise. Consultation, on the other hand, may occur at any point during the franchise, and it is
more likely to involve the problems peculiar to a particular franchise than the more generalized
training programs.
153. See supra note 66; see also Spandorf et a]., supra note 66, at 5 ("[C]ourts have noted that
in the typical franchise relationship the franchisee depends on the franchisor for the basic viability
of the venture."). Franchisor information packets to prospective franchisees routinely extol the
franchisor's training programs. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen C. Johnson, President, Franchise
Dept., Macayo Mexican Restaurants, Inc. (Fall 1992) (form letter to inquiring potential franchis-
ees, with accompanying brochures about the restaurant chain, stating that "Macayo offers our
franchisees assistance in all facets of restaurant management, from inventory control, personnel
training and accounting procedures to quality control").
154. See supra note 71 (describing the wide latitude given by contract to the franchisor's
training of its franchisees).
155. See, e.g., KFC Corp. v. Goldey, 714 F. Supp. 264, 266 (W.D. Ky. 1989); In re Gaines-
ville P-H Properties, Inc., 77 B.R. 285, 294-95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); Azcuy v. Amoco Oil Co.,
Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 8394, at 15,450 (N.D. Ga. June 11, 1985); Dayan v. McDonald's
Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 995 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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operational goals or needs.156 Almost all franchise contracts provide for
operating manuals, 157 and most give franchisors the unilateral right to re-
vise these manuals. 5 In effect, the contracts give the franchisor great dis-
cretion over maintaining and even altering the system-wide standards.1 59
Franchisees, again, depend upon the franchisor's expertise and presumably
expect that, to ensure uniformity, all of the system's outlets-whether
franchised or not-will have to obey the same rules.' 6 ' If a franchisor fails
to update its standards, the system may be weakened; it is thus in both the
franchisor's and franchisee's interest to impose an affirmative obligation on
the franchisor to maintain the necessary standards.161 The franchisor's nec-
essary flexibility over operational standards and revisions is difficult to con-
trol in a realistic fashion via the franchise contract,' 62 but the discretion can
be tempered by fiduciary standards limiting the franchisor's ability to abuse
its naturally dominant position over the franchisees.
5. Variance in Contractual Terms for Other Franchisees
Many franchise agreements expressly provide that the terms offered a
franchisee may vary from those offered to other franchisees in the same
system. 63 Such variance, however, contradicts a franchisor's arguments
that it cannot bargain over terms with franchisees. The franchisor argues
that uniformity is essential-that what the franchisee seeks is uniformity
156. See, e.g., Al Bishop Agency, Inc. v. Lithonia-Division of Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 474 F,
Supp. 828, 833-34 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (concluding that reasonable, nondiscriminatory sales penetra-
tion goals were not met); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Perkins, 251 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Neb.
1977) (stating that a car dealer failed to maintain an auto showroom and to employ salespeople);
Tappan Motors, Inc. v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 479 N.E.2d 804, 805 (N.Y. 1985) (explaining that a
dealer did not maintain sufficient inventory to meet customer needs).
157. Infra app. § A-4-a (98%).
158. Infra app. § A-4-b (59%).
159. Supra note 71 (quoting an illustrative clause). As stated by one franchise attorney:
Although the basic terms of the franchise agreement (such as royalty and advertising
fees and length of term of the franchise) usually are not subject to change, terms such as
operating standards, hours of business, approved products can be modified or varied by
reasonable changes to the operations manual. In drafting the clauses in the franchise
agreement regarding operational assistance and the operations manual, therefore, care
must be taken to allow for flexibility.
Ronald P. Roman, Structuring the Franchise Agreement and Related Documents, in FLORIDA
BAR, CLE Comm., FRa~cmss LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.5, at 4-5 (1993).
160. It may seem strange, then, that a number of franchise agreements expressly provide that a
supposedly uniform system's franchise agreements may vary from franchise to franchise. Infra
app. § A-5 (finding such a clause in 26% of surveyed contracts).
161. Infra app. § A-4-c (finding that 92% of surveyed contracts impose quality control stan-
dards, and 48% control what the franchisee can sell).
162. Roman, supra note 159, § 4.5, at 4-5 (concluding that a confidential, easily amended,
operations manual "is a very effective method of supplementing many of the franchisee's contrac-
tual obligations").
163. See supra note 160.
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insofar as it improves the marketing of the trademark, the business con-
cepts, and the overall goodwill that the franchisee purchases. 164 Consistent
with this argument, some states statutorily bar a franchisor's discriminatory
treatment of one franchisee as compared to others.' 65 Such disparate treat-
ment could result in the unfavored franchisee making a discrimination
claim. 166
It is in the best interest of franchisor and franchisee that any variances
among the franchised system's outlets be minimal. To do otherwise would
permit an erosion of standards and a growing cynicism on the part of those
franchisees who object to what they perceive as an overly indulgent
franchisor. 167 Thus, the fiduciary standard is appropriate: (1) The fran-
chisee relies on the franchisor's expertise in allowing or refusing sys-
tem-wide variations, (2) the franchisor clearly dominates and has superior
knowledge and bargaining power over the franchisee, (3) the clause grant-
ing franchisor discretion to treat franchisees differently calls for great flexi-
bility in its application, and (4) the interests of franchisor and franchisee are
the same-they seek an optimal method of marketing and sales. 168
6. Opening and Financing
Franchisor assistance in opening a franchised business is essential. 1 69
The parties naturally expect the franchisor to play a crucial role in the new
164. See Spandorf et al., supra note 66, at 5-6.
165. Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-206(2) (Michie 1987) (en-
acted in 1977); California Fair Dealership Law, CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 80-86 (West 1982) (enacted in
1980); California Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,220 (West Supp. 1993) (en-
acted in 1970); Hawaii Franchise Investment Law, HAw. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(C) (1985) (en-
acted in 1974); Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, 815 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 1718 (West's
Smith-Hurd 1993) (enacted in 1987); Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Act, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-2-2.7-2(5) (Bums 1989) (enacted in 1976); Michigan Franchise Investment Law, MicH.
COMP. LAws § 445.1527(e) (1989) (enacted in 1974, amended in 1984); Mm'N. STAT. ANN.
§ 80C.14 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); Nebraska Franchise Practices Act, NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 87-406(2) (1987) (enacted in 1978); New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:10-7(b) (West 1989) (enacted in 1971); Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act,
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(c) (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (enacted in 1971); Wis-
consin Fair Dealership Law, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.04 (West 1991) (enacted in 1974). There
also are anti-discrimination provisions found in franchising statutes covering particular industries.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-411 (Michie 1987) (auto dealerships).
166. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Robert A. Makin, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 401, 403 (W.D.N.Y.
1986) (referring to discrimination among franchisees as a violation of Illinois law). But see
Kilday v. Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp., 516 F. Supp. 162, 163 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding that
a uniform franchise agreement does not entitle franchisees to require that franchise provisions be
enforced uniformly).
167. Such a franchisor could face lawsuits by other franchisees for breaching its duty to pro-
tect the franchised trademark. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Mack, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
9530 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1989).
168. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Spandorf et al., supra note 66, at 5.
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outlet's formative stages, and a failure to meet that expectation may lead to
a successful claim against the franchisor.170 Indeed, one-half of the sur-
veyed agreements contain clauses about franchisor assistance in opening the
franchisee's business. 171
Likewise, franchisees often depend upon the franchisor to help them
obtain financing. 172  Most do not directly supply the financing, 73 but
franchisors often help franchisees "set up a relationship with a financing
entity."' 74 While an express, contractual clause concerning financing
assistance is infrequent,175 when such clauses are used the franchisee and
franchisor share the same interests. Presumably the franchisor has greater
experience and a far superior position with respect to gaining the necessary
financing. As with contractual clauses on opening the franchise, fiduciary
concepts are suitable under these circumstances.
7. Advertising
Most franchise agreements grant the franchisor power over advertis-
ing.' 76 Almost all agreements mandate continual franchisee advertising ex-
penditures, usually into funds subject to the control or strong influence of
the franchisor. 17 7 The franchisor's dominance may extend into control over
the franchisee's own signs or other advertising on the franchisee's own
170. See, e.g., Ciampi v. Red Carpet Corp. of Am., 85 DAImy J., D.A.R. 1474 (May 10, 1985)
(holding a franchisor liable for the false promises of its salesmen, even though the franchisor
corrected the misrepresentations before the franchise agreement was executed); see also Spandorf
et al., supra note 66, at 3-4 (discussing Ciampi).
171. Infra app. § A-6-a.
172. For instance, of the 148 franchisors listed in WEBSTER, supra note 56, at 238-87, 44
provide direct financing assistance to the franchisee. See also FRANCHISE HANDBOOK, Spring
1994, passim (providing brief information on more than 1,700 franchisors, most of which will
either furnish some direct financing or at least help the franchisee in seeking loans from a bank or
some other source).
173. Michael Garlick, The Franchise Relationship: Counseling Potential Franchisors and
Franchisees, in FLORIDA BAR, CLE COMM., supra note 159, § 3.90, at 3-36.
174. Id. (contending that when franchisors do provide financing, their rates "are usually lower
than rates obtained through institutional sources").
175. Infra app. § A-6-b (finding that only ten percent of the surveyed contracts have such a
clause).
176. Infra app. § A-7-a, b (finding that 77% of the surveyed contracts call for the franchisor to
control and manage the system's advertising; 62% have the franchisor itself run the
advertisements).
177. Infra app. § A-7-c (reporting that 94% of surveyed agreements require that a percentage
of the franchisee's gross sales be devoted to advertising, generally via a franchisor-controlled
plan; sometimes, the franchisee must also pay for local advertisements). The median percentage
of required advertising spending is three percent of gross revenues. Infra app. § A-7-c.
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business premises.17i  As a result, most franchisees must spend a substantial
amount on advertisements before they open their businesses.' 79
As with other clauses indicating a fiduciary standard, the contractual
clauses on advertising involve franchisee expectations of franchisor exper-
tise,18 0 a presumably superior (in knowledge and bargaining power)
franchisor, the need for flexibility in structuring and restructuring how ad-
vertising money is spent, and a coalescence of franchisor and franchisee
interests. Franchisors require discretion in carrying out the advertising pro-
grams provided for in franchise contracts.'"' Both franchisor and fran-
chisee benefit from successful advertising campaigns. Again, a fiduciary
approach makes sense.
C. Clauses Requiring "Good Cause"
Several important clauses usually found in franchise agreements do not
require the protections of a fiduciary-type relationship, but call for more
than a simple reading of basic contract law. These clauses arguably require
"good cause" for the franchisor to enforce them.182 This section addresses
the several subjects that courts should analyze under the "good cause" stan-
dard: territorial development and protection, covenants against competi-
tion, franchise transfers, franchisor assignments, franchise terminations and
nonrenewals, and miscellaneous provisions such as pricing, supplies, busi-
ness hours, franchisee employees, inspections, and auditing.
This middle approach retains principles of contract law, except that it
requires a showing of good cause for various franchisor actions even when
the express contractual terms state otherwise. Some affirmative evidentiary
burdens, albeit less than are required of a fiduciary, rest upon the franchisor.
Indeed, with "good cause" clauses, such as termination, the focus becomes
the overall rationality and fairness of the franchisor's decision rather than
the literal or implicit meaning of the contractual terms.
178. Infra app. § A-7-d (finding that 29% of surveyed contracts give the franchisor a right to
enter franchised business premises and remove or destroy objectionable signs or advertising); see
also GARNER, supra note 10, § 3:19, at 31 ('The right to approve or disapprove franchisee adver-
tising is typically wholly within the franchisor's discretion.").
179. Infra app. § A-7-e (reporting that 64% of the agreements require the franchisee to spend
on "Grand Opening" advertising; $4,000 is the median amount required).
180. As with the failure to provide grand opening assistance, a franchisor's failure to arrange
needed advertising can be actionable. See, e.g., supra note 170 and accompanying text.
181. Courts have upheld the franchisor's contractual right of unlimited discretion in determin-
ing how to spend the franchisees' advertising funds. E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Kellogg, Bus.
Franchise Guide (CCII) 9730 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 1990); Thompson v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 673
F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
182. For a discussion of the "good cause" standard in a franchising context, see supra notes
99-117 and accompanying text.
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Unlike a fiduciary approach reaching even farther afield from "pure"
contract law, the good cause requirement has been adopted by a number of
courts and legislatures. 8 '
1. Territorial Development and Protection
Rapid territorial development is often an important reason businesses
choose to franchise. 1 84 Sometimes franchisors grant franchisees an exclu-
sive, protected area,'85 precluding the franchisor from competing with the
franchisee.' 86 The idea is that franchisee protection leading to franchisee
growth redounds to the benefit of the entire franchised system.
To franchisees, protection of their particular business territories may
be crucial. Obviously, if the franchisee wants and is able to expand its
business, the franchisee's and franchisor's interests may coincide. When a
franchisee simply wishes to protect its own area without necessarily ex-
panding, the interests may differ dramatically.
A franchisee that is content with its present size cannot realistically
expect the franchisor to forego expansion; nevertheless, it does seem rea-
sonable to require the franchisor to act in good faith and accord a franchisee
a right of first refusal. Thus, before establishing another franchisee nearby
and thereby permitting encroachment on areas the franchisee already serves,
the franchisor should give the original franchisee the opportunity to acquire
that new outlet. 187 In a broader sense, regardless of whether there are
183. See, e.g., Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 973 (1l. App. Ct. 1984) (finding
good cause a requirement for termination); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (N.J.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974) (holding that good cause must be shown for termination);
accord Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 139 (5th Cir.) (following the
Marinello decision), reh'g denied, 597 F.2d 772 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979); see
also H.R. 5233, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b)(2) (1992) (containing the section of the proposed
Federal Fair Franchise Practices Act that prohibits terminating a franchise without good cause);
supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing state-imposed requirements of good cause for
termination).
184. Garlick, supra note 173, § 3.35, at 3-21. But see Knack & Bader, supra note 123, at 41
(contending that a franchisor should refrain from rapid, uncontrolled market development-per-
haps nationwide-in favor of efforts limited to "particular markets in which [the franchisor] can
focus its resources").
185. Garlick, supra note 173, § 3.88, at 3-35.
186. For example, the franchisor may be barred from placing company-owned units in the
same area where the franchise already operates.
187. To attract new franchisees, improve relations with existing franchisees, and head off pos-
sible lawsuits or the enactment of new federal or state franchising statutes, a few "maverick"
franchisors have voluntarily revised their contracts and operating procedures to give franchisees
more rights. Perhaps most notable in this regard is the unilateral decision of Great Clips, Inc., a
Minneapolis franchisor of family hair salons, to grant first-refusal rights to all its franchisees as a
way to fight encroachmenL Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Focus on Franchising: LaFalce Gains Al-
lies in House to Halt Franchise Abuses, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1993, at B2.
Of course, the franchisee with first-refusal rights must meet the qualifications of any appli-
cant for the new franchise. Some franchisees have stronger territorial powers under the franchise
1994] FRANCHISOR'S DUTY OF CARE
first-refusal rights, a court should impose "good cause" obligations upon the
franchisor that, if not met, would bar the arbitrary establishment of compet-
ing businesses in the vicinity of an existing franchise.
In Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,' the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a summary judgment in favor of a
defendant-franchisor that opened a competing hotel near the plain-
tiff-franchisee's hotel in downtown New Orleans. The franchise agreement
expressly reserved to the franchisor the right to construct and operate other
Holiday Inn hotels at any place "other than on the site licensed" to the
franchisee.189 According to the trial and appellate courts in Domed Sta-
dium, as well as courts in comparable cases,' the implied covenants of
good faith and fair dealing could not overcome countervailing, express lan-
guage in the agreement.191 Yet a higher standard-"good cause"-might
have prevailed. The standard would assure that franchisees have some pro-
tection from one-sided, pro-franchisor contractual provisions, which are es-
pecially troubling in light of the franchisee's weakened bargaining posture
due to its sunk costs and its dependence on the franchisor for so many other
services such as training, advertising, and the maintenance of overall stan-
dards throughout the system.' 92
contract because they have been expressly granted some, albeit usually small, exclusive territory.
Infra app. § B-1 (reporting that 46% of surveyed agreements grant exclusive territory to the fran-
chisee, with a median radius of one mile; 25% expressly stated that the franchisee had no exclu-
sive territory).
188. 732 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984).
189. Id. at 483.
190. See, e.g., Fickling v. Burger King Corp., 843 F.2d 1386 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished
opinion discussed in Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 798 F. Supp. 684, 689 (S.D. Fla. 1992));
Biscuit Inv., Inc. v. Cajun Enters., Inc., No. CIV.A.89-2778, 1991 WL 42584, at *2-5 (E.D. La.
Mar. 27, 1991); Rado-Mat Holdings, U.S., Inc. v. Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc., Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 1 9975 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1991).
191. In Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991), the court invoked
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing to bar the franchisor's opening of nearby outlets.
Id. at 549. While the Scheck franchise agreement expressly denied the franchisee any exclusive
territory, id., it did not contain Domed Stadium language granting the franchisor the right to open
additional business outlets anywhere other than on the franchisee's own site. Without any ex-
pressly contradictory language in the contract, the Scheck court was free, unlike the Domed Sta-
dium court, to find implied protections for the franchisee. See supra notes 134-35 for further
discussion of this case.
192. Franchisees are not necessarily in a weakened bargaining position when they first agree
to a contract containing territorial provisions. Potential franchisees may "shop" for the best possi-
ble investment, be it a franchise or something else. Emerson, supra note 1, at 1509 n.21. That,
however, is not equal bargaining power, or anything even approximating such power. See supra
notes 110-14 and accompanying text. Moreover, in "good cause" matters, the issue includes
whether the franchisor holds a superior position over the franchisee at a later time-when the
franchisor seeks to act under a particular clause in the franchise contract. The then-existing dis-
parity in power may lead to an unjustified diminution of the "vested interest a franchisee [has
built] in his business through years of effort and expenditures." Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp.,
454 F.2d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 1971).
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2. Covenants Against Competition 193
A franchisee's covenant not to compete must be ancillary to an other-
wise lawful contract, the franchise agreement, and must be reasonable in
scope.194 States have adopted this common-law approach prohibiting cove-
nants as unreasonable restraints of trade unless they are necessary to protect
the covenantee, not injurious to the public, and reasonable in time, subject
matter, and territory.195
If franchisors were fiduciaries for their franchisees, then any noncom-
petition clause most likely would be unenforceable, 96 a rather anomalous
result given the ubiquitous nature of such provisions. 197 However, an accu-
rate reading of the law on fiduciary relationships should allay the fears of
franchisors; an element crucial to the establishment of a fiduciary relation-
ship-that the noncompetition clause be incomplete or require a great deal
of franchisor discretion in its enforcement-typically is not true of noncom-
petition clauses.1 98 The clause is generally worded in some detail so as not
It is thus plain that a "good cause" standard would not bar the fmnchisor from exercising its
contractual rights if the franchisor established a fair reason for availing itself of those rights.
Actions within the contracting parties' reasonable contemplation of future appropriate franchisor
behavior would meet the "good cause" test.
193. For extensive analysis of this topic, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants
Against Competition, 1-19 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
194. RESTATEmENT OF ComRAcTS § 515 cmts. b, c (1932) (stating that the ancillary covenant
must be necessary to further the legitimate goals of the contract and that the concept of "reasona-
bleness" applies to the protected interests as well as the covered activities, time, and geographic
scope).
195. See, e.g., MINN. R. 2860.4400 (1992); O.V. Marketing Assoc., Inc. v. Carter, 766 F.
Supp. 960, 965-67 (D. Kan. 1991); Economou v. Physicians Weight Loss Ctrs., 756 F. Supp.
1024, 1031 (N.D. Ohio 1991); In re KBAR, Inc., 96 B.R. 158, 160 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1988); South
Bend Consumers Club, Inc. v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 209, 213 (N.D. Ind.
1983), appeal dismissed, 742 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1984); Kutka v. Temporaries, Inc., 568 F. Supp.
1527, 1536 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Gafnea v. Pasquale Food Co., 454 So. 2d 1366, 1368-69 (Ala.
1984); U-Haul Co. of Central Ill. v. Hindahl, 413 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Herrington
v. Hall, 624 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1993) (regulat-
ing covenants concerning the sale of a business's goodwill, licensing of trademarks, or dissolution
of a partnership); MICH. COMP. LAws § 445.774a (1989) (dealing with covenants by employees);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987) (concerning the sale of a business's goodwill or the dissolu-
tion of a partnership); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50-.51 (Supp. 1994) (addressing the
enforceability of a covenant against competition); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (1988) (governing
covenants by an employee); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 & cmt. d (1981) (dis-
cussing covenants against competition generally).
196. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 & cmt. a (1981).
197. Infra app. § B-2 (reporting that 98% of surveyed contracts contain noncompetition
clauses).
198. For instance, the noncompetition clause in the Carvel Retail Manufacturer's License
Agreement is typical of most such franchise agreement provisions, both in its scope and
specificity:
To prevent dilution of the exclusivity of the valuable Carvel know-how and Carvel trade
secrets to be acquired by Licensee [franchisee] hereunder, it is agreed as part of the
consideration to, and inducement for, Carvel entering into this Agreement, that in the
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to be vague or otherwise "unreasonable."' 99 Moreover, another fiduciary
element-similarity of interest-is definitely absent from noncompetition
clauses; there is a direct conflict between the franchisor's interests in pro-
tecting its "property" after a franchise is terminated200 and the franchisee's
interest in maintaining its ability to earn a livelihood.21
A dilemma remains, however. Judging the covenant's "reasonable-
ness" requires examination of two seemingly polar principles: freedom to
contract, even to contract away certain rights, and an individual's freedom
to work.20 2 Public policy demands close scrutiny of these covenants be-
cause the franchisees may have severely limited their opportunities to work
via a lengthy, complex, and confusing contracting process in which the
event Licensee sells the Carvel store or abandons the Carvel Store provided for in this
Agreement, or in the event
this Agreement expires, or is terminated for any reason except for Carvel's
breach, then for a period of three (3) years next following such event Licensee shall not
directly or indirectly engage in whole or in part in the production, distribution or sale of
ice cream or other frozen desserts whether as a proprietor, employee, officer, director,
agent, joint venturer, partner, or other capacity whatsoever, at the location of the within
Carvel Store or, within a radius of two (2) miles of the site of the within Carvel Store.
The provisions of this Paragraph shall survive expiration, termination, abandonment or
other cancellation of this Agreement.
Carvel Retail Manufacturer's License Agreement, June 30, 1992, at 17, para. 31 (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
199. See supra note 198. The same Carvel clause, with extremely minor differences in word-
ing, was enforced against a former Carvel franchisee in Carvel Corp. v. Eisenberg, 692 F. Supp.
182, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
200. The protected franchisor property interests may include customer contacts. See, e.g.,
Gold v. Holiday Rent-A-Car Int'l, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that a
franchisee's competition with its former franchisor included diversion of potential customers and
thus affected the franchisor's legitimate, protectable interests); South Bend Consumers Club, Inc.
v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 209, 213 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (upholding a two-year
post-term restraint as reasonably necessary to protect customer relationships with the franchisor);
McCart v. H & R Block, Inc., 470 N.E.2d 756,763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that a franchisor
has a protectible interest in the goodwill relationship developed with the franchisee's customers);
Budget Rent-A-Car of Washington, Inc. v. Raab, 302 A.2d 11, 13-14 (Mvd. App. 1973) (refusing
to apply a covenant against an ex-franchisee because, in part, there were no private customer lists
or personal contact with customers for the former franchisee to exploit); Herrington v. Hall, 624
S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that customers and goodwill are legitimate interests
for a franchisor to protect via a noncompetition covenant).
201. Some courts expressly provide that a noncompetition covenant must not impose undue
hardship on the covenantor. C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of Covenant Against
Competition, Ancillary to Sale or Other Transfer of Business, Practice, or Property, as Affected
by Territorial Extent of Restriction, 46 A.L.R.2d 119,204 (1956). Other courts, while mentioning
that covenants can be enforced only after balancing the parties' interests, nonetheless appear to
ignore the degree of hardship on the covenantor. See, e.g., Schnucks Twenty-Five, Inc. v. Betten-
doff, 595 S.W.2d 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
202. Drechsler, supra note 201, at 200.
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other side arguably holds grossly superior bargaining power. Requiring
"good cause" for enforcement should not obstruct a franchisor's legitimate
interest in avoiding unfair competition. It could, however, prevent former
franchisees' from being barred from the productive use of their talents with-
out some showing that the franchisor genuinely needs such a restraint.
3. Franchise Transfers and Franchisor Assignments
Occasionally franchisees wish to transfer their franchises to other par-
ties. Almost all franchise agreements grant the franchisor a right of first
refusal on the franchisee's proposed transfer,204 as well as the right to deny
any transfer.20 5 Courts have generally upheld these provisions. 20
6
Some transfers are involuntary in that the franchisee dies and passes
the franchise on to the heirs. An overwhelming number of franchise agree-
ments allow transfer by inheritance so long as the heirs meet the standard
franchise agreement terms, but most clauses bar transfers unless the
franchisor approves the heirs.2" 7 When such approval is required, the par-
ties' interests may be adverse. Although there may be many acceptable
reasons for a franchisor to decide not to permit a transfer, the need for the
franchisor to show "good cause" would probably eliminate the most oppor-
tunistic reasons and provide some sense of security for the franchisee.
Other franchise transfers are voluntary. For instance, the franchisee
may wish to retire or to pursue another career. The inability to effectuate a
transfer leaves the franchisee with sunk costs and an inability to recover its
investment. While franchisors certainly have a right to expect that the fran-
chisee, or the franchisee's assigns, will comply with the franchise agree-
ment, absolute franchisor discretion to deny a transfer subjects the
franchisee to potential abuse. Requiring the franchisor to demonstrate
"good cause" in denying a transfer would offset the imbalance in power
between the franchisor and franchisee.
The same reasoning supports a "good cause" approach to the
franchisor's ability to assign the contract to a new party. Many franchise
agreements include clauses stating that the agreement is freely transferable
203. Hadfield, supra note 57, at 963 (describing the franchising relationship as a "highly inti-
mate and interdependent" relationship "between unequals"); see also supra notes 114, 192 (dis-
cussing the relative bargaining positions of franchisees and franchisors).
204. Infra app. § B-3-a-1 (95% of surveyed contracts).
205. Infra app. § B-3-a-2 (93% of surveyed contracts).
206. See, e.g., C.L. Thompson Co., Inc. v. Festo Corp., 708 F. Supp. 221, 227 (E.D. Wis.
1989) (upholding a franchise termination because the franchisee tried to transfer the franchise
without the franchisor's consent).
207. Infra app. § B-3-a-3 (reporting that 89% of surveyed contracts expressly permit some
form of transfer by inheritance, with 60% specifically providing that the franchisor must approve
the heirs).
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by the franchisor,"' while almost all deny any such right to the
franchisee.20 9
4. Franchise Terminations and Nonrenewals
Most franchise agreements contain a statement that any violation of
the agreement is considered a material breach.210 With the considerable
discretion afforded franchisors under most franchise agreements, franchises
are subject to termination by franchisors for all sorts of violations, even
ones that would-absent the contractual clause about materiality-consti-
tute de minimis breach.21' The same problem exists'for franchisor deci-
sions about franchise renewals and leases.212 While franchise agreements
frequently contain clauses about renewal or lease approval, they rarely out-
line the grounds for granting or denying renewal or for lease approval;213
thus, the franchisor may have unbridled discretion in this area.
To counter this problem, the parties should specify in the franchise
agreement which breaches are truly material. Almost every agreement will
list some particular grounds for termination.214 The author's survey of one
hundred fast-food, ice cream, and restaurant franchise systems reveals that
the following grounds are often specified: franchisee's insolvency and/or
bankruptcy, 215 loss of lease,2" failure to operate the business,217 conducting
208. Infra app. § B-3-b-1 (66%).
209. See supra note 205.
210. Infra app. § B-4-a (87%); see also Hadfield, supra note 57, at 940 (discussing typical
franchise clauses).
211. Conversely, relatively few franchise agreements expressly permit franchisees to termi-
nate the franchise relationship, and these few limit termination rights to a few extreme cases of
significant contractual breaches by the franchisor. Infra app. § B-4-b (14%). Even then, franchis-
ees must give notice, usually some 30 to 90 days ahead of time. Infra app. § B-4-b.
212. Franchise renewals and lease approvals are similar in that, by the time these decisions are
made by the franchisor, the franchisee may have invested substantial money, effort, and time and,
often, have developed considerable goodwill in the business. To deny a franchise renewal or a
lease approval without any reasonable justification seems unconscionable; as with terminations
during the term of a franchise agreement, the decision to reject a renewal or a lease should require
a showing of "good cause."
213. Infra app. § B-4-c to B-4-f (including, at § B-4-e, that 38% of the surveyed contracts vest
the option to renew entirely with the franchisor, and, at § B-4-f, that 21% specifically require
franchisor approval of the franchisee's lease). That the renewal provisions generally are less de-
tailed than the termination clauses may prove especially troubling because a decision against re-
newal appears more likely than one to terminate during the term of a franchise. See HAROLD
BROWN, FRANcHiSING: REAtrrs AND REmEDms § 2.03[2] (1993) (concluding that "[tihe
franchisor's right not to renew is more important, although not so immediate to the franchisee,
than the franchisor's right to terminate"); HAROLD BROWN, FRANcHismsn: REALTriES AND RamE-
DIES FoRMs VOLUME § 2.02, at 2-23 to 2-24, 2-26 to 2-27 (1991).
214. Infra app. § B-4-g (100% of surveyed contracts).
215. Infra app. § B-4-g-1 (91%).
216. Infra app. § B-4-g-2 (72%).
217. Infra app. § B-4-g-3 (65%).
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an unlawful enterprise,21 being found guilty of a crime, 219 abandonment of
the business, 220 or denial of franchisor access to inspect the franchised
business.22'
Even without such specificity in the termination clause, grounds
clearly exist for termination when a breach not only threatens the viability
of the franchisee's business but has, or threatens to have, an impact upon
the entire franchised system. For example, in Dayan v. McDonald's
Corp.,222 the franchisor had good cause to terminate regardless of contrac-
tual specificity because the franchisee had failed to maintain quality, ser-
vice, and cleanliness standards.223 Such basic problems do not merely
affect the individual franchisee's business in terms of lost customers,
problems with governmental regulators, and possible lawsuits; rather, any
continuous, serious problem with one franchise may impact the business for
other franchises. Lost goodwill can extend beyond the local franchise to the
entire system. 224 Furthermore, if nothing happens to the substandard fran-
218. Infra app. § B-4-g-4 (32%).
219. Infra app. § B-4-g-5 (32%).
220. Infra app. § B-4-g-6 (13%).
221. Infra app. § B-4-g-7 (9%).
222. 466 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
223. Id. at 975.
224. Economists have warned that the threat of free-riding is greatest with business format
franchises. Free-riding has been explained as follows:
Because the quality information [about products distributed via a franchised system]
applies to groups of franchisees using a common name, there is a free-riding problem.
If each franchisee supplies inputs that significantly influence the quality of the product
marketed, and consumers cannot detect the quality of the product before they purchase
it, then each franchisee will have the incentive to cut costs and supply less than the
desired level of product quality. Because the product is standardized, consumers who
receive products of less than anticipated quality will blame the entire group of retailers
using the common name. The individual franchisee directly benefits from the sales of
the lower-quality product, and the other franchisees share in the losses caused by de-
creased future demand.
Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L.
& EcoN. 345, 349-50 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy,
Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 S. EcoN. J. 572, 577 (1976) (arguing for
the tying of franchisor products to the grant of a franchise as an effective method for deterring
franchisee opportunistic behavior); J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust:
The Trouble With Tie-Ins, 58 CAL. L. Rav. 1085, 1118 (1970) (discussing tying arrangements);
Kurt Strasser, Big Macs and Radio Shacks: Antitrust Policy for Business Format Franchises, 27
AIuz. L. Rav. 341, 344, 351 (1985) (same); Note, A Clarification and Reformulation of Prevailing
Approaches to Product Separability in Franchise Tie-In Sales, 67 MiN,. L. Ray. 1165, 1175 n.49
(1983) (The free-rider principle states that "[a]ny customer dissatisfied with an individual
franchise will associate his or her dissatisfaction with all of the franchises. The low quality indi-
vidual franchisee, however, can still rely on the quality of all other franchises to maintain the
public perception of its quality."); Comment, A New Approach to the Legality of Franchising
Tie-Ins, 129 U. PA. L. Rav. 1267, 1296 n.180 (1981) ("In a system of franchised retail or distribu-
tion outlets, each franchisee has an incentive to reduce the quality of service he provides below the
optimal level, because the level of patronage he receives is determined by the reputation of the
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chisee, other franchisees may conclude that they can reduce their costs, al-
beit at the expense of quality, with little risk of franchisor retaliation. In
such cases, the franchisor should be able to take immediate, strong meas-
ures, including perhaps termination.22
A "good cause" standard with regard to breach thus appears to impose
no additional burdens on the franchisor besides those expressly or implicitly
found in the contract itself. If challenged, the franchisor should have little
difficulty in proving "good cause" for cases of material breach. Rather, the
"good cause" requirement affords some protection to the franchisees from
opportunistic franchisors that wish to usurp economic benefits established
at the risk and expense of a threatened or terminated franchisee. Most
franchisors seem to recognize this point; they generally do not permit termi-
nation, except for good cause, until after the expiration of a grace period for
franchisees to correct a breach of the franchise agreement.226
Without some limits on the franchisor's power to terminate
franchises-whether grace periods or "good cause" standards-the
franchisor simply has too much control over the franchisee's business life.
A prime example of the franchisor's capacity to abuse its powers of termi-
nation is presented in Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.227 In
Corenswet, a franchise for the distribution of major appliances was subject
to termination "at any time for any reason" upon ten days' notice to the
other party. 228 The franchisee, Corenswet, spent considerable time, effort,
enterprise as a whole as well as the reputation of his individual operation. Each franchisee thus
has an incentive to 'free ride' on the goodwill associated with the trademark.").
Free-riding is potentially most severe at locations (e.g., along an interstate highway) where
the probability of repeat sales to that same customer is quite low. Klein & Saft, supra, at 350
n.20. Courts have recognized this problem, see, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 380 (1977), but refuse to adopt an expansive view of free-riding
that might undermine the purposes of the antitrust laws, see, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2092 (1992) (refusing to accept defendant Kodak's argu-
ments that plaintiffs, who repaired office equipment, were free-riders because they failed to enter
the equipment and parts market; to do so, the court held, would support the very evil proscribed by
the antitrust laws-entry barriers-by requiring competitors to enter two markets simultaneously).
225. Infra app. §§ B4-i to k (reporting that 60% of the surveyed contracts explicitly provide
that the franchisee will immediately cease operations upon the franchise's termination, 54% ex-
tend to the franchisor an option to purchase the terminated franchise's equipment, and 11% ex-
pressly give the franchisor a right to purchase the entire franchised business upon termination).
226. Infra app. § B-4-h (88% of the surveyed contracts, with a median grace period of 30
days). Another interpretation would be that franchisees have some leverage, not that franchisors
simply recognize the grace period implications arising out of a "good cause" standard. This alter-
native viewpoint is as follows: The franchisee's power to insist on a grace period results from a
statutory and case law trend toward providing greater franchisee protection from arbitrary
termination.
227. 594 F.2d 129, 131-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
228. Id. at 132. The franchise was of indefinite duration, and originally the termination clause
read "with or without cause" instead of "for any reason." Id. at 131.
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and money on the franchise,2 29 and thereby greatly enlarged the
franchisor's market coverage.23  Nonetheless, despite Corenswet's compli-
ance with every franchisor request concerning Corenswet's financial secur-
ity, the franchisor terminated the franchise on the grounds that Corenswet
was underfinanced. 31
Franchisor Amana had begun negotiating with another entity long
before Corenswet was notified of termination.232 The trial court concluded
that the real reason for the termination was not finances, but franchisor ani-
mosity toward the president of the franchisee's parent company.233 While
unprepared to require a good cause limitation on terminations "for any rea-
son," the trial court required some reason for the franchisor's actions. The
trial court thus issued a preliminary injunction against the termination.234
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned the trial court's
decision.235 It found no support for implying a term barring termination
without cause when the franchise agreement expressly allowed such termi-
nations.236 One wonders, though, why it is an undue burden on franchisors
to have some objectively reasonable basis for terminating or failing to re-
new a long-term franchise in which the franchisee has invested so much
work and money.237 Indeed, numerous legislatures have enacted laws
against franchise termination or nonrenewal except for "good cause. 2
38




232. Id. at 133.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 131.
236. Id. at 138. The appellate court expressed its strong doubts that public policy "frowns on
any and all contract clauses permitting termination without cause." Id.
237. Courts generally have declined to adopt a "good cause" requirement for franchise termi-
nations in the face of express contractual provisions allowing a termination. See Pennington's,
Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 10,022, at 23,267 & n.3 (D. Mont.
Dec. 2, 1991). However, they might accept arguments of unconscionability to overturn such an
express clause. Id. at 23,268 (citing DeTraville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th
Cir. 1971), for the proposition that a contract provision giving the franchisor a right to terminate
without cause on 30 days' notice was barred as contrary to equity and good conscience).
238. Supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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5. Miscellaneous Provisions
Franchise contracts often include clauses that concern prices;239 re-
quire purchases from the franchisor or approved suppliers;' impose
mandatory minimal hours of operation and full-time participation of the
franchisee; 41 require franchisor approval of and specifications for the
franchised business manager and other employees;242 grant the franchisor
rights to inspect the franchisee's business operations, 3 and conduct internal
audits;2 " and permit the franchisor to waive franchisee breaches.245 Courts
should scrutinize these clauses more carefully than they would under simple
contract law. Courts should ask whether "good cause" existed for the
franchisor to impose and enforce this condition upon the franchisee. For
example, if customer "traffic" does not justify keeping a franchised outlet
open twenty-four hours a day, a franchisor who requires those hours ap-
pears to lack "good cause."" 6 The same holds true if a franchisor is unable
to "back up" a requirement by providing the supplies, training, or other
239. Infra app. § B-5-a-1 (stating that although no surveyed contracts place price restrictions
on items sold by the franchisee, nine percent provide that the franchisor might advise the fran-
chisee about pricing).
240. Infra app. § B-5-a-2 to a-4 (reporting that 84% of surveyed agreements require franchisee
purchases from the franchisor or franchisor-approved vendors).
241. Infra app. § B-5-b (reporting that 44% of surveyed contracts provide for specified hours
of operation by the franchised outlet; 30% require that franchisees work full-time for the
franchised business, and 5% mandate that the franchisee work at least 15 to 20 hours per week at
the franchised business).
242. Infra app. § B-5-c (reporting that 30% of surveyed contracts provide that the franchisor
has a right of approval over the franchised business' manager, and 56% state franchisor specifica-
tions about the franchisee's employees).
243. Infra app. § B-5-d (91% of surveyed contracts).
244. Infra app. § B-5-e (90% of surveyed contracts).
245. Infra app. § B-5-f (reporting that 87% of surveyed contracts provide that there is no
franchisor waiver of franchisee default). Franchisors must be aware of the potential for a waiver
whenever they try to "work with" a franchisee rather than simply enforce a contractual require-
ment. See Stephen Horn & Robert L. Zisk, Practical Considerations in Enforcing Standards, 12
FRANCHISE L.J. 97, 118 (1993) (citing Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steuben-
ville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 651 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982)). Because some states
prohibit discrimination against similarly situated franchisees, either in a franchise contract's terms
or in the enforcement of those terms, a "waiver" for one franchisee may result in a "waiver" for
all. Horn & Zisk, supra, at 118; see also supra notes 160, 163-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing franchisor discrimination against franchisees). Perhaps the problem can be solved by: (1)
a franchisor's sending "new day" notices informing all of its franchisees that from that point on,
the heretofore waived contractual standards will be enforced, and (2) when the first new violation
occurs, a franchisor's quickly responding to force compliance or obtain other remedies. Horn &
Zisk, supra, at 120.
246. Franchisors may argue that the need for franchise uniformity creates a "good cause,"
especially if 24-hour service is part of the system's image.
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support the franchisee needs. 47 In all of these cases, the franchisor wields
considerable discretionary power and the franchisee reasonably expects the
franchisor not to abuse its power. Imposing a "good cause" standard on the
interpretation of these provisions not only acts as a safeguard against possi-
ble franchisor opportunism but is also consistent with law and policy trends
in many states.248
D. "Arm's Length" Clauses: Applying No More Than the General,
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The common law imposes on the parties an implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of a contract. 249
The duty of good faith and fair dealing limits either party's use of discre-
tionary powers or other advantages over the other party, but this implied
limit may be contradicted-and, in effect, overturned-by a directly contra-
vening express term in the contract7 °0
Under "ordinary" contract principles a court may, in evaluating the
parties' good faith, consider their subjective intent. The concept of good
faith naturally encompasses the manner in which parties actually have used
the powers created by their agreement, not simply the parties' relative
strength, as is often the focus of fiduciary analysis. The burden, in effect,
remains on a plaintiff-franchisee to demonstrate that a franchisor's actions
were in bad faith.
Certain clauses are constant and do not invite the degree of franchisor
discretion as do the clauses requiring a fiduciary relationship or "good
cause"." These "constant," common-law contract clauses usually involve
terms fixed or otherwise determinable at the outset of the agreement and are
not subject to later negotiations and possible franchisor "power plays."
Although franchisors and franchisees may never have truly equal bargain-
ing power," - these clauses are agreed on before the franchisee spends its
247. In Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
918 (1980), the franchisee was allowed to ignore a 24 hours-per-day provision because the
franchisor could not supply sufficient petroleum products to sustain that many operating hours.
248. For articles citing and discussing the numerous franchise relationship laws states have
enacted, including numerous "good cause" laws, see Emerson, supra note 1, passin; Pitegoff,
supra note 16, passim.
249. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRpcrs § 205 (1981).
250. That is, the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing disappear because the express
term supersedes them.
251. See supra notes 121-248 and accompanying text.
252. See generally Harold Brown, Franchising: Punitive Damages and Contractual Arbitra-
tion, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 28, 1993, at 3, 29 (discussing adhesion contracts, an absence of equal bargain-
ing power, and the unfair provisions that "overbearing" franchisors include in their contracts
against the franchisees' interests); Robert L. Purvin, Jr., Comments on Proposed Federal Regula-
tion of Franchising, 12 FRANcHisE L.J. 12, 12 (1992) (noting attorney Purvin's Congressional
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capital and otherwise incurs substantial costs. Other clauses may appear to
have been agreed upon at a similarly early date, but they are-through the
discretionary powers vested in the franchisor and by the very nature of such
clauses-much more susceptible to franchisor manipulation throughout the
life of a franchise agreement. Also, for many of these other clauses-con-
cerning such topics as site selection, training, renewals, and operating pro-
cedures-the franchisee may reasonably believe (and even be led by the
franchisor to believe) that its interests and those of the franchisor coincide
or are at least similar. By contrast, under the common-law contract clauses
each party's interests manifestly are adverse." 3
When negotiating these fixed, common-law contract provisions, the
franchisee presumably realizes that they involve franchisor interests com-
pletely different from its own interests. Thus, the franchisee has the chance
to reject the franchisor's offer as unfair or one-sided before the franchisee's
own investment in the enterprise leaves it at a disadvantage. 54 The parties
should be allowed to negotiate these provisions freely, with an expectation
that-should the matter be litigated-a court will consider this portion of
the contracting process as negotiated at arm's length.
1. Royalties and Other Franchise Fees
Other than the initial franchise fee, which is generally a set amount
ranging from a few thousand dollars to tens of thousands of dollars, 5 roy-
alties and other franchise fees are usually a percentage of gross sales. 6
The percentage is fixed in the initial franchise agreement. Before potential
franchisees spend substantial capital, they can decide whether the fee struc-
ture is acceptable. Because the rates are part of a system-wide fee scale,
committee testimony that he "had never written or read a franchise agreement that [he] would
recommend a franchisee sign").
253. For example, the franchisee wants to pay the lowest royalty possible, while the franchisor
wants to receive the highest royalty possible.
254. Even commentators sympathetic to franchisee claims of franchisor abuse have recog-
nized that the potential franchisee generally faces less pressure than the edsting franchisee. See,
e.g., Emerson, supra note 1, at 1509 n.21 (discussing the inequity of many franchise agreements,
but noting that potential franchisees tend to "shop" for the best franchise available); Hadfield,
supra note 57, at 951-55 (explaining that franchisors can indulge in opportunistic behavior once
the parties have entered into a franchise agreement, but not when they are still negotiating the
agreement).
255. Infra app. § C-l-a (finding that 100% of surveyed contracts include an initial franchise
fee, at a median amount of $20,000).
256. Infra app. §§ C-l-b to -c (reporting that 100% of surveyed contracts include royalty fees,
at a median amount of five percent of gross sales; 12% of the contracts specify a minimum
amount to be paid regardless of gross sales, at a median amount of $500 per month). Special fees,
usually for a fixed amount, include: a renewal fee (23% of the surveyed agreements at a median
amount of $3,000), a relocation of franchise fee (11% of the surveyed agreements at a median
amount of $3,500), and a transfer fee for shifting the franchise to a new franchisee (78% of the
surveyed agreements at a median amount of $5,000). Infra app. § C-l-d to -f.
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franchisors effectively have little, if any, discretion to alter the rates for one
party. Also, information about fees, including royalties, is widely available
from "how-to" books" 7 and offering circulars" 8 long before a potential
franchisee may see a sample franchise agreement.
2. Franchise Time Periods, Arbitration and Venue Stipulations, and
Insurance Requirements" 9
Franchise time periods, arbitration and venue stipulations, and insur-
ance requirements typically are rather straightforward provisions. Franchis-
ees would have difficulty arguing that these clauses, while drafted by the
franchisor, were meant to be in the franchisees' best interests.260 The plain
meaning of these clauses controls over any argument about franchisor bar-
gaining power generally.261 Moreover, these clauses are definite and com-
plete.262 They neither require flexibility in interpretation or enforcement,
nor do they call for an inquiry into the parties' subjective intent or expecta-
257. E.g., ROBERT L. PERRY, THE 50 BEST Low-INvESTMENT, HIGH-PROFIT FRANCHISES
(1990); Companies Offering Franchises, FRANCHISE HANDBOOK, Spring 1994, at 45-211.
258. This information is required by both the FTC Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1-436.3 (1992), and
by the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular Guidelines adopted by a number of states. See Emer-
son, supra note 1, at 1512-13 & nn.34-36.
259. Infra app. § C-2.
260. In other words, these clauses would not qualify for interpretation under a
franchisor-as-fiduciary test.
261. For instance, courts typically experience little difficulty enforcing an arbitration clause
against a franchisee. They tend to ignore the alleged disparities of power between franchisor and
franchisee and instead resolve any doubts about the scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitra-
tion. See Kroll v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 10,122, at 23,867-68
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 1992) (reviewing the claims of a terminated franchisee and finding that the
duty to arbitrate those claims "survive[d] the termination of a [franchise] contract").
262. The following are sample clauses.
Time Period
CBC grants to FRANCHISEE AND FRANCHISEE accepts a franchise for a period of
Twenty (20) years to use the CBC Systems and the CBC Marks only in the operation of
a Casey's Beef Cafe ("Franchised Restaurant") at - more fully described in Exhibit
'A' ("premises"). The term of this Agreement shall commence on the date the
Franchised Restaurant opens for business (the "Commencement Date") and shall expire
Twenty (20) years thereafter (the "Term") unless sooner terminated in accordance with
the provisions of this Agreement. FRANCHISEE agrees to operate the Franchised Res-
taurant at the specified location for the entire Twenty (20) year Term. FRANCHISEE
accepts this franchise with the full and complete understanding that the franchise grant
contains no promise or assurance of renewal.
BROWN, supra note 213, § 8.01, at 8-4.
Arbitration
Except as otherwise provided herein, any controversy or claim regarding one or more of
the following matters shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association: (1) Restrictions on or
designation of sources of supply for any food, products or equipment used by franchis-
ees; (2) Compliance with franchisor's minimum standards of design, quality, or appear-
ance for franchisees; (3) Geographical definition of franchisee's exclusive territory; (4)
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tions; thus, these clauses do not meet the good cause standard. When deal-
ing with these clauses, there simply is no empiric or policy basis for holding
franchisors to a higher standard than that imposed under ordinary contract
law. If any disputes arise under these clauses, implied covenants and gen-
eral rules of construction263 should provide authority for resolving these
disagreements.
3. Declarations About the Ownership of Intellectual Property
Generally, franchising concepts can develop into a franchise system
only via the licensing of trademarks or other intellectual property.2 ' The
franchisee's trademark license often is the heart of its franchise. Contrac-
tual clauses concerning intellectual property are quite commonplace, and
are, in fact, rather routine in wording and operation. In essence, these
clauses remind the franchisee of the obvious: that the franchisor owns the
intellectual property that it licenses the franchisee to use,265 that this prop-
erty's use is restricted to purposes related to the maintenance of the
Compliance with restrictive covenants; or (5) Payment of royalties or advertising
contributions.
Id. § 8.01, at 8-59 to 8-60.
Venue
Any cause of action, claim, suit or demand allegedly arising from or related to the terms
of this Agreement or the relationship of the parties shall be brought in the Federal Court
for the District of Minnesota or in Hennepin County District Court, Fourth Judicial
District, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Dairy Queen Operating Agreement, February 1992, at 27-28, Section 14, para. H.
Insurance
FRANCHISEE agrees to carry at his expense during the Term of this Agreement Com-
prehensive General Liability insurance, including Products Liability and Broad Form
Contractual Liability, in an amount of not less than ONE MILLION ($1,000,000) DOL-
LARS per occurrence for bodily injury and FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($500,000)
DOLLARS per occurrence for property damage, or in such increased amounts as [the
franchisor] may reasonably request from time to time during the Term of this Agree-
ment. Each policy will name [the franchisor] as additional insureds, will provide that
the policy cannot be canceled without Thirty (30) days prior written notice to [the
franchisor], and shall insure the contractual liability of FRANCHISEE [as specified in
another section of the Agreement]. Prior to the Commencement Date, FRANCHISEE
shall furnish to [the franchisor] a Certificate of Insurance reflecting that the insurance
coverage is in effect. All policies shall be renewed, and a renewal Certificate of Insur-
ance mailed to [the franchisor] prior to the expiration date of the policies.
BROWN, supra note 213, § 8.01, at 8-34.
263. For example, most courts construe ambiguous, written terms in favor of the party not
responsible for drafting the agreement. RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 206 (1981)
(stating the general rule that when a term or promise has several possible meanings, it will be
interpreted against the party who supplied the contract or the term).
264. See supra note 1 for a definition of franchising.
265. See, e.g., infra app. § C-3-a (90% of surveyed contracts).
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franchised business,266 and that-on the franchise's termination-all of the
property rights remain with the franchisor.2 67
These intellectual property clauses tend to involve terms fixed or
otherwise determinable at the outset of the agreement and are not subject to
later negotiations. As with franchise fees, the intellectual property clauses
generally must be uniform throughout the system, and franchisors effec-
tively have little if any discretion to alter them for a particular franchisee.
These clauses are definite and complete.268 Unlike the good cause or fidu-
ciary clauses, they neither necessitate franchisor flexibility in interpretation
or enforcement nor require any analysis other than a review of the plain
meaning of the contractual language.269
4. Declarations About the Franchisee's Review of the Franchise
Contract Before Signing It
A number of statements found in franchise agreements essentially
serve as documentary evidence that the franchisee was apprised of certain
information and that it obtained the independent advice necessary to evalu-
266. See, e.g., infra app. § C-3-b (reporting that 95% of surveyed contracts contain trademark
restrictions).
267. Infra app. § C-3-c (78% of surveyed contracts).
268. The following is a sample clause covering trademarks, trade names, service marks, and
trade secrets:
FRANCHISEE acknowledges that ownership of all right, title and interest to the CBC
System and the CBC Marks, are and shall remain vested solely in CBC [the franchisor],
and FRANCHISEE disclaims any right or interest therein or the goodwill derived there-
from. FRANCHISEE agrees that all materials loaned or otherwise made available to
him and all disclosures made to FRANCHISEE and not to the general public by or at the
direction of CBC at any time before or during the Term of this Agreement relating to the
CBC System, including, without limitation, the Manual in its entirety, financial informa-
tion, marketing strategy and marketing programs are to be considered trade secrets of
CBC for purposes of this Agreement and shall be kept confidential and used by FRAN-
CHISEE only in connection with the operation of the Franchised Restaurant and other
franchised [CBC] Restaurants. FRANCHISEE agrees not to divulge any of the trade
secrets to any person other than his employees and then only to the extent necessary for
the operation of the Franchised Restaurant and, specifically, that FRANCHISEE will
not, nor permit anyone to, reproduce, copy or exhibit any portion of the Manual or any
other trade secrets of CBC. [FRANCHISEE shall not] cause to be done any act or thing
disputing, attacking or in any way impairing or tending to impair CBC's right, title or
interest in the CBC Marks of the CBC System. FRANCHISEE shall immediately notify
CBC of all infringements or limitations of the CBC Marks which come to his attention
or challenges to FRANCHISEE's use of any of the CBC Marks.
BROWN, supra note 213, § 8.01, at 8-30 to 8-31.
269. The only intellectual property concept that may require a higher standard of fmnchisor
care involves the franchisee's work product. See infra app. § C-3-d (reporting that 3% of sur-
veyed contracts expressly state that all franchisee concepts become the franchisor's exclusive
property). The general problem of fraud, ignorance, or the like masking the true value of the
intellectual property is distinct and has no effect on the need for trademarks themselves to be
accorded better protection.
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ate the proposed franchising arrangement. These provisions often include
statements that the franchisee was advised to obtain legal counsel concern-
ing the franchise contract27" and that the franchisee, in fact, obtained advice
from independent legal, accounting, and other advisors prior to signing the
franchise agreement.271 The vast majority of contracts surveyed by the au-
thor contain the following provisions: (1) a statement that the franchisee
has received no guarantees, representations, warranties or the like as to the
profitability of the franchise being purchased, and that the franchisee has
conducted its own independent investigation of the merits of its invest-
ment;272 (2) a proviso that the franchisee is an independent contractor rather
than an agent of the franchisor;273 and (3) a merger clause, for purposes of
the parol evidence rule.27 4 Again, these straightforward clauses are com-
plete, definite, and call for no discretionary judgments on the part of the




Courts should consider two issues when analyzing the franchising rela-
tionship. First, courts should consider the type of relationship that applies
to the particular clause in question. The nature of the franchise relationship
should depend on the clause at issue. Some clauses require a fiduciary rela-
tionship, while others are best suited to a contractual analysis bolstered by
the affirmative obligation to show good cause for the action taken; still
other clauses should be analyzed according to common-law contract princi-
ples-including the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing-but
nothing more.76 Second, the court should ask what the particular relation-
270. Infra app. § C-4-a (25% of surveyed agreements). Seven percent of the agreements also
include the declaration that the franchisee had the opportunity to obtain clarification about any
aspects of the proposed franchise. Id. § C-4-b.
271. Infra app. § C-4-c (14% of surveyed contracts).
272. Infra app. § C-4-d (85%).
273. Infra app. § C-5 (91%).
274. Infra app. § C-7 (79%). An "integrated agreemenf' is a writing that constitutes "a final
expression of one or more terms of an agreement." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRcrs
§ 209(1) (1981). Under the parol evidence rule, the effect is as follows: "A binding integrated
agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.... [or] to
the extent that they are within its scope." Id. § 213(1)-(2). "Where there is a binding agreement,
either completely or partially integrated, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or
negotiations is not admissible in evidence to contradict a term of the writing." Id. § 215; accord
BLACK's LAW DicrnoN~AY 1117 (6th ed. 1990) (discussing the parol evidence rule).
275. Certainly, there could be fraud, mistake, or some other "externa'" problem with the prac-
tical application of these declarations. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 213, §§ 4.01-4.02. However,
the declarations themselves are straightforward and, absent one or more external factors, can be
interpreted according to ordinary contract law.
276. See supra notes 61-117 and accompanying text.
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ship requires of the parties. While state courts could handle this matter
independently, the more efficient approach would be to create a uniform,
national law.27 7 Some even argue that the maze of state law necessitates
federal regulation.27
A well-crafted, national law could take into account differences in the
franchise relationship depending upon the particular contract clause. 279 A
277. See, e.g., W. Michael Garner, Editor's Column: Live by the Sword.... 12 FranCHIsE
LJ. 2, 17 (1992) (contending that United States franchisors and franchisees "need a national
standard requiring good cause for termination").
278. Throughout the past three decades, federal franchise relationship statutes have been pro-
posed and then stymied. STAFF OF HoUsE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 49, at 60 &
n.125. For example, a 1971 proposal went nowhere, and a comprehensive study released that
same year, Tim ECONOMIC EFFEcTs OF FRaNcinSmo, supra note 20, produced no concrete results.
Other full-scale attempts at federal legislation-the Fair Franchise Practices and Distribution
Practices Reform Act, H.R. 9144, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and the Franchising Termination
Practices Reform Act, H.R. 5016, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)-likewise were defeated. See
also Pitegoff, supra note 16, at 291 & n.8 (discussing the defeat of the proposed federal acts). As
recently as 1992 and 1993, new proposals have been put forward. See, e.g., H.R. 5232, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposed Fair Franchise Disclosure and Consumer Protection Act); H.R.
5233, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposed Federal Fair Franchise Practices Act); H.R. 5961,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposed, but unenacted, Federal Fair Franchising Practices Act,
submitted by Representative James H. Scheuer); Tannenbaum, supra note 187, at B2 (reporting
that Representative John J. LaFalce, chairman of the House Small Business Committee, had intro-
duced three franchising bills, with more than a dozen co-sponsors for each); see also Jeffrey A.
Tannenbaum, Focus on Franchising: Briefs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1992, at B2 ("The Interna-
tional Franchise Association, a trade group for franchisors, says it will form a franchise council
aimed at increasing understanding between franchisors and franchisees."). But it is still unclear
whether any of these bills could pass and what form they would have after making it through both
houses of Congress. Telephone Interview with Dean M. Sagar, Professional Staff Member, U.S.
House Comm. on Small Business (Aug. 30, 1993) (stating that the legislative process is highly
uncertain); David J. Kaufmann, Franchising Law: Legislation and Cases in 1993, N.Y. L.J., Dec.
23, 1993, at 3, 3 (noting that while several hearings were held and a number of co-sponsors
secured, the proposed federal franchise relationship law resubmitted by Rep. John LaFalce
(D-N.Y.) in 1993 "has yet to be taken up by any House committee which possesses legislative
authority" and has not been considered by the Senate; instead, it simply seems that in 1994 addi-
tional hearings may be held by the House of Representatives' Committee on Small Business,
which has no legislative power); David J. Kaufmann, Outside Counsel: Franchising News and
Notes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 1993, at 3, 3 (reporting that an anticipated upsurge in state "franchise
relationship" legislation as well as substantial progress toward enacting a federal franchise rela-
tionship law failed to materialize in 1993); see also David J. Kaufmann, Franchising: Legislative
and Judicial Update, N.Y. L.i., Jan. 7, 1992, at 1, 7 ("[S]ignals from Washington, D.C., regard-
ing the possible enactment of federal franchise legislation are mixed: at times the Small Business
Committee appears aggressive, and at other times the subject appears to be on the back burner.").
But see Tannenbaum, supra, at B2 ("[T]here now is a specter of a broad based, bipartisan coali-
tion supporting some kind of franchise legislation" (quoting Neil A. Simon, a Washington lawyer
for franchisors)).
279. About one-third of the states have enacted franchise relationship laws that require a
showing of "good cause," supra note 112 and accompanying text, while others rely on judicially
created covenants of good faith and fair dealing, see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
Franchisors and franchisees have an extremely difficult time, however, predicting outcomes of
disputes due to inconsistent statutes and case law. See generally Pitegoff, supra note 16, at
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recent federal proposal attempted to apply a fiduciary duty to franchisor
bookkeeping, collection, payroll, accounting, and advertising services on
behalf of franchisees.280 It also placed upon franchisors a duty of due care,
requiring them to exercise the "skill and knowledge normally possessed by
franchisors in good standing in the same or similar types of business."28'
This duty, however, might have had an unintended, anticompetitive effect,
as "start-up franchisors" could have been "scared away from considering
franchising as a method of expansion if they [were] to be held to the stan-
dard of mature franchisors."282 In addition, the bill permitted franchisors to
disclaim the due care duty; if the bill had become law, most franchisors
probably would have taken that option.283 Finally, the proposal had no
"bright line standards"; businesses and courts simply would not have
known when a duty arose.284 A much more workable approach would be to
take the actual, typical clauses found in a franchise agreement and assign
them an already well-established interpretative standard.285 With such a
basic approach in place nationally or at least in most states, dispute resolu-
tion between franchisors and franchisees would produce far more consistent
results.
To apprise prospective franchisees of their rights, statutory provisions
setting forth the fiduciary and good cause standards for certain parts of
franchise contracts should be included in the required disclosures made
292-319 (arguing that franchise relationship laws often reflect political outcomes rather than a
uniform approach to franchising).
280. H.R. 5233, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(c) (1992) (proposed Federal Fair Franchise Prac-
tices Act).
281. Id. § 4(b). The standard is modeled after the common-law duty of due care for profes-
sionals-blacksmiths, plumbers, lawyers, doctors, and others-found in the RESTATEMENr (SEC-
OND) OF ToRTs § 299A (1977). Andrew C. Selden, LaFalce Proposals Challenge Franchising,
12 FRANcHISE L. 13, 13 (1992). The standard presents extremely complex definitional
problems, however. Richard M. Asbil, Franchise Commentary, 12 FRANcHISE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1992);
H. Bret Lowell, Comments on Federal Franchise Disclosure and Relationship Bills, 12
FRANcHIsE L.J. 10, 11 (1992).
282. L. Seth Stadfeld, Comment on Proposed U.S. Franchise Legislation: A Search for Bal-
ance, 97 CoM. LJ. 540, 561-62 (1992).
283. Asbil, supra note 281, at 9. Many commentators have criticized this due care provision.
For instance, franchise attorney L. Seth Stadfeld commended the goal-eliminating from the mar-
ketplace incompetent franchisors-while lambasting the proposal for setting "a standard which is
too high" and "would accomplish more harm than good." Stadfeld, supra note 282, at 561.
284. See Lowell, supra note 281, at 11.
285. This approach would be used instead of a tort standard-the "duty of due care," see
supra note 281 and accompanying text-which has not often been found in court interpretations
of the franchise relationship. The suggested approach, because it readily fits the contract law
interpretations already in place, seems both more useful and more readily adopted. See generally
Selden, supra note 281, at 13 (noting the reluctance of parties and courts to apply tort law stan-
dards to franchising, probably because "many have regarded [franchising] as an exclusively con-
tractual relationship").
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under the FTC Rule.286 Statutory and regulatory coverage must include the
general franchise relationship. In other words, franchisors should not be
able to evade the statutory or regulatory standards by placing certain sub-
jects outside the formal franchise agreement signed by the parties.
Congress may decide that some topics or clauses should be susceptible
to disclaimer or limitation, if placed conspicuously in the documents pro-
vided to the prospective franchisee.28 7 With an explicit waiver by the pro-
spective franchisee, perhaps a fiduciary standard could be "reduced" to
good cause. Any waiver should include statements to the effect that the
franchisee is familiar with the protective statute whose possible future
assistance it has forsworn and that the franchisor or its agents have made no
representations, oral or written, about the quality of care to be furnished in
the disclaimed subject area.
Prior federal proposals, as well as state laws or model enactments, may
serve as the pattern for specific statutory language.288 A key provision-
one that should be emphasized in the mandated disclosure to prospective
franchisees 2 89-is that the franchise relationship is not defined solely by the
written franchise agreement. Over the course of a long-term business rela-
tionship, the terms of the parties' written contract can be modified by subse-
quent conduct. 290 Franchisees, especially, must realize that courts will
look at what the parties have said and done throughout their relationship,
not just at the documents they signed when the relationship began. On the
other hand, just as post-signing conduct may bring statutory standards into
play, so an earlier contract-one entered into before the law was enacted-
may shelter the franchisee from some or all of the new law. Giving the law
a prospective effect may occasionally result in cases involving
286. See generally supra notes 6-7 (discussing the FTC Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 436.1-.3 (1993)).
287. That is an "out" currently permitted under the proposed Federal Fair Franchise Practices
Act. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
288. For example, the recently enacted Iowa law on franchising provides that a franchisor's
"good cause" to take some action against the franchisee's interests "is cause based upon a legiti-
mate business reason" and not arbitrary or capricious when compared to the franchisor's actions in
other, similar circumstances. IowA CODE § 523H.7(1) (1993); see also Kealey Pharmacy &
Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345, 348-50 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
franchisor's termination of all franchises while preserving the company-owned outlets, although
expressly permitted in the franchise agreement, lacked "good cause"), The Iowa statute declares
that a franchisor's good cause to take action includes the franchisee's failure to comply with a
material, legal requirement in the franchise contract. IowA CODE § 523H.7(l).
289. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
290. UNi. FRANCIUSE AND BusWss OPPoRTuNrrrIs Acr § 105 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 116 (Supp.
1993).
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"grandfathered" contract clauses, but such an approach appears to be the
only constitutional and feasible method of adoption.29'
If a federal statute or regulation were impossible, then state legislatures
or courts still could adopt the three-standard analysis presented in this Arti-
cle. Although one may argue that the methodology suggested herein would
lead to court battles over which standard governs which clauses, most
clauses can easily be placed within one of the three classifications,292 and
the present situation already entails numerous interpretative fights over
franchise relationship standards. Recognizing that the contract typically
cannot be treated as a whole-that instead each pertinent clause must be
considered separately-should leave courts and legislatures with a more
manageable task.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts' varying approaches to the interpretation of franchise agree-
ments illustrate that the franchise relationship remains poorly defined.
Courts and legislatures have drawn from contract principles, added good
cause provisions, and even attempted to apply a fiduciary relationship to
franchises. The problem is that these and other approaches try to treat a
comprehensive, continuing relationship as if the parties' expectations, any
issues of enforcement, and the relative strengths of the parties are substan-
tially similar for all portions of an extremely lengthy franchise agreement.
Which courts and legislatures treat franchise relationships the fairest?
Many of the various approaches adopted by courts and legislatures have
merit, depending on the contractual clause in dispute. Individually, how-
ever, the various approaches provide little direction for businesspersons
who try to interpret the basis and scope of the franchising relationship. For
instance, is the nature of the relationship the same for all provisions in the
franchise contract, or should there be, as suggested in this Article, recog-
nized differences in the franchisor's duty of care to franchisees?
291. The proposed federal laws would be prospective. Stadfeld, supra note 282, at 565. In
other words, these bills would, if enacted, "apply only to franchise agreements entered into,
amended, exchanged or renewed after [the bills'] enactment." Id.
In McDonald's Corp. v. Nelson, 822 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Iowa 1993), the court held that the
Iowa Franchise Act of 1992 violated the Contract Clauses of both the United States Constitution
and the Iowa Constitution insofar as the Iowa Franchise Act substantially impaired the plain-
tiff-franchisors' contractual rights. Id. at 609. Such rights included those expectations that
"played an integral role in the pricing of the [franchised) licenses" and that were present when the
franchise parties, long before the Act was passed, executed their license agreements. Id. at 606.
292. The fight probably would be more systemic than case-by-case. It would involve debate
over the policies underlying the suggested categories, as well as the judicial or legislative delinea-
tion of which clauses fall under which category, rather than disputes over what type of clause (site
selection, royalties, etc.) is before the court in a particular case.
1994]
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Unlike simpler contracts, a franchise agreement deals with a complex,
ongoing, evolving relationship. As a result, the agreement cannot possibly
contemplate all the situations it may eventually govern. For example, many
franchise agreements allow the franchisor to amend the specifications for
the franchise facility.293 Most notably in the 1970s, fast-food franchisees
had to adjust to the addition of drive-through windows.2 94 Questions arose
about both the financing and construction of these improvements.295 Courts
had to address situations not necessarily considered by either party, even
though the franchise contract itself tended to give rather blanket authority
for franchisor actions. 296
Because of its long-term, evolving consequences, a franchise relation-
ship is much more than a written agreement.297 There are numerous, addi-
tional examples of post-contract changes inadequately covered by the initial
written arrangement. Franchise agreement provisions typically must, and
do, afford the franchisor wide discretion in many areas.298 This discretion,
though, offers the franchisor the opportunity to act irresponsibly.299
The inability of most franchisees to negotiate many of the terms of the
franchise agreement300 may adversely affect their businesses. Franchisees
invest capital to build these businesses, while franchisors retain the right to
terminate the franchises.30 1 In many instances, franchisors of necessity
hold great discretionary power;302 but potential exploitation 0 3 must be re-
strained. National or relatively uniform state laws defining and establishing
the essential characteristics of the franchise relationship would enable both
293. Infra app. § A-2-d (59% of surveyed contracts).
294. See Gary Taylor, Franchise Reform to Yield Feast: Experts Predict Boom Times for
Lawyers, NAT'l L.J, Jan. 20, 1992, at 1, 12 (recognizing "(t]he unique nature of the franchise
relationship" and the potential problems that business law practices encounter); see also supra
note 150.
295. Taylor, supra note 294, at 12,
296. Will the same type of cases arise in the 1990s as franchisors adopt no-smoking policies
for some or all of their restaurants?
297. See, e.g., Selden, supra note 281, at 13 ("[A] franchise relationship in most cases really
is (or is presented by the sales representative as involving) more than just a contract
relationship.').
298. See Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (referring
to franchisor Burger ing's contractually provided "discretion over advertising spending" and
citing cases involving other fast-food franchisors with the same powers); supra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 71 (sample advertising clause).
299. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 1522 n.84.
300. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 1, at 1508-09 & nn.20-21; Hadfield, supra note 57, at
962; see also supra notes 114, 192 (describing the inequality in the bargaining relationship).
301. One commentator has labeled this ability as franchisor "opportunism." See supra note
119. Once a franchisee has invested its initial outlay of fixed or sunk costs, the franchisor is
positioned to take advantage of that franchisee. Hadfield, supra note 57, at 951-52.
302. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
303. For examples of actual exploitation, see Emerson, supra note 1, at 1522 n.84.
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franchisees and franchisors to better understand their rights and duties.
That understanding would lead to a greater sense of fair play in their deal-
ings. By making the franchisor's duty of care contingent on the nature of
the franchise relationship, as determined by the specific provision in ques-
tion, the courts and legislatures would finally turn for guidance to the very
criteria that gave rise to the relationship. That approach is not only logical,
it is just.
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APPENDIX
Review of 100 Fast-Food, Restaurant, and Ice Cream Parlor Franchise
Agreements Dated from February 1991 to January 1993.
Summary of Headings in Appendix
A. FiucL.Y CLAUSES - Pages 967-68
1. Site Selection 5. Variance in Contractual
2. Layout Terms for Other
3. Franchisor Training of Franchisees
Franchisee 6. Opening and Financing
4. Operating Standards 7. Advertising
B. "GooD CAUSE" CLAUSES - Pages 968-72
1. Territorial Development 4. Franchise Terminations
and Protection and Nonrenewals
2. Covenants that Franchisee 5. Prices, Supplies, Hours,
Cannot Compete After Franchisee Full-time
Termination Status, Franchisee
3. Franchise Transfers and Employees, Inspections,
Franchisor Assignments Auditing, and Waiver
of Franchisee Breaches
C. OaiuN)AY CoNTRACT LAW CLAUSES - Pages 973-75
1. Royalties and Other
Franchise Fees






















Comparable figures from a 1971 Study, supra note 20, are listed for
comparison under the heading "1971" when there are such figures (pages
201-56 of that Study). When there are no comparable figures in the 1971
Study, this fact is indicated by a -
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THE NUMBERS BE-
LOW REPRESENT THE PERCENTAGE (%) OF FRANCHISE
AGREEMENTS CONTAINING PARTICULAR CLAUSES
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1971 1993
A. FIDUCIARY CLAUSES
1. SrrE SELECTION 45 71
a. Franchisee picks, with Franchisor
approval required - 53
b. Franchisor picks 18
c. Franchisee required to pay for
Franchisor's services 8
2. LAYOUT
a. Franchisor Approval of Franchised
Business' Layout Required 64 73
b. Franchisor Actually Does the Layout
Itself (not part of the 73%) - 10
c. Specifically Requiring Franchisor
Approval of All Alterations 36 11
d. Franchisor Right to Mandate Future
Modifications of the Layout - 59
(1) specifically providing that required
remodelling cannot take place
before a certain time period has
lapsed (generally, five years) - 8
(2) specifically providing that any
mandated modifications are entirely
at the expense of the Franchisee - 16
3. FRANCHISOR TRAINING OF FRANCmSEE
a. General Provision 100
b. Training expressly at Franchisee's
expense 43
c. Franchisor performs consulting
services for the Franchisee after the
initial training 45 59
4. OPERATING STANDARDS
a. Franchisor-issued operating manuals 61 98
b. Franchisor right to revise the franchise
agreement/operating manual 38 59
c. Goods sold at the franchise outlet:
(1) Quality control standards 82 92
(2) Product line control (what can be
sold) 61 48
19941
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1971 1993
5. VARIANCE IN CoNTRACruAL TERMS FOR
OTHER FRANCHISEES
a. General provision - franchise
agreements may vary from franchise
to franchise - 26
6. OPENING AND FINANCING
a. Franchisor assistance in franchised
outlet's opening 45 50
b. Franchisor assistance to franchisee in
obtaining financing - 10
7. ADvERTisING
a. Franchisor to Run Advertisements 29 62
b. Franchisor to Control and Manage the
System's Advertising 53 77
c. Percentage of Gross Sales Revenue
Franchisee Must Spend on
Advertising (pay for
franchisor-controlled ads and,
sometimes, pay for local ads):
(a) 5-7% - 5
(b) 5% - 15
(c) 4% - 19
(d) 3% - 15
(e) 2.5% - 2
(f 2% - 32
(g) 1% 6
(In addition, of the above 94 agreements for 1993 requiring the
franchisee to devote a percentage of sales revenue to
advertising, 10 specified a minimal amount to spend on
advertising regardless of how small the revenue base might
be.)
d. Franchisor Right to Enter Franchised
Business Premises and Remove or
Destroy Objectionable Sign or
Advertising 13 29
e. Required Franchisee Expenditures on
"Grand Opening" Advertising - 64
(1) Median amount required $4,000
B. "GOOD CAUSE" CLAUSES
1. TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION
a. Exclusive territory granted to
franchisee 60 46
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1971
(1) Median radius of territory
(2) Expressly stated that no exclusive
territory
2. COVENANTS THAT FRANCHISEE CANNOT
COMPETE AFTER TERMINATION
a. General Provision
b. Competition against any existing
franchise in the franchised system
(sometimes even including planned
franchises not yet operating)
(1) For a certain time period after the
franchise termination
(a) Median time frame
(2) For a certain geographic distance
from any such franchisee
(a) Median distance
c. Provision that noncompetition covers
only the territory from which the
terminated franchisee had his own
operations
(1) For a certain time period after the
franchise termination
(a) Median time frame
(2) For a certain geographic distance
from any such franchisee
(a) Median distance
d. Provision that courts shall make a
noncompetition clause reasonable
rather than throw it out as too broad
e. Providing liquidated damages for a
breach
f. Barring the hiring of the Franchisor's
employees
(1) Median time frame
3. FRANCHISE TRANsFERS AND FRANCHISOR
ASSIGNMENTS
a. Franchise Transfer
(1) Franchisor's Right of First
Refusal on the franchisee's
proposed transfer/sale of the
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1971 1993
(2) Requirement that Franchisee
Obtain Franchisor's Approval
before selling, assigning or
otherwise transferring the
franchise 83 93
(3) Right to inherit the franchise 64 89
(a) Heirs must meet franchise
agreement terms 64 27
(b) Heirs must be approved by
the Franchisor - 60
(c) Franchisee can sell a less




(1) Franchisor has right to assign the
franchise agreement to another
party 66
4. FRANCHISE TERMINATIONS AND
No NwAt.s
a. Any Franchisee violations of the
franchise agreement are material - 87
b. Franchisee right to terminate franchise 9 14
(All of the 1993 agreements permitting termination by the Franchisee
require that the Franchisee first give notice, with the required period usually
being from 30 to 90 days, but as high as 2 years. Also, one agreement
stated that the termination can only be for an uncontested material breach of
the franchise contract by the Franchisor, and another provided liquidated
damages for the Franchisor if inadequate notice was fumished-2 years'
worth of royalties.)
c. Renewal Period Specified
(1) Three or more periods - 9
(a) Median time per period - 10 years
(2) Two periods - 12
(a) Median time per period - 10 years
(3) One period - 56
(a) Median time period - 10 years
d. Renewal at the option of
Franchisee - 35
(1) Notice period specified - 24
(a) Median time period for
notice - 6 to 12 mos.
e. Franchisor option to renew - 38
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f. Franchisor Approval of
Franchisee's Lease Required 18 21
g. Specified grounds for Franchisor
termination of the franchise: 100 100
(1) Franchisee's insolvency and/or
bankruptcy 79 91
(2) Franchisee's Loss of Lease 14 72
(3) Franchisee is no longer in
business - 65
(4) Franchisee is conducting an
unlawful enterprise 32
(no requirement that this be
proven in criminal court)
(5) Franchisee has been found
guilty of unlawful activity 32
(6) Franchisee abandonment of the
business 13
(7) Franchisee denied Franchisor
access to inspect the franchised
business - 9
h. Grace periods for the Franchisee to
correct a breach 68 88
(median grace period for 1993 agreements with such provisions-30
days; often shorter periods for failure to make payments due to the
Franchisor-such as 5, 7, 10, or 15 day periods)
i. Provision that Franchisee shall
immediately cease operations upon
its termination 47 60
j. Franchisor right to purchase
franchised business upon
termination - 11
k. Franchisor's option to purchase
equipment of franchisee upon the
franchise's termination 44 54
5. PRIcEs, SUPPLIES, HouRs, FRANCHSEE
FULL-TIME STATUS, FRANCHISEE
EMPLOYEES, INSPECTIONS, AUDIrrING,
AND WAIVER OF FRANCHISEE BREACHES
a. Prices and Supplies
(1) Price restrictions on items sold
by Franchisee 13 0
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(Of the 1993 agreements, 10% specifically stated that pricing was solely
within the Franchisee's discretion, and 9% provided that the Franchisor
might advise the Franchisee about pricing)
(2) Required Franchisee purchases
from the Franchisor 33-43 11
(3) Products that must be
purchased either from the
Franchisor or from
Franchisor-approved vendors - 13
(4) Required Franchisee purchases
from Franchisor-approved
vendors 43-53 60
b. Business Hours and Franchisee
Full-time Status
(1) Specified hours of operation
for franchise outlet 62 44
(10% of 1993 agreements
require 24-hours-a-day,
seven-days-a-week operations)
(2) Requirement that Franchisee
work full-time concerning the
franchised business 12 30
(3) Requirement that Franchisee
work at least 15-20 hours per
week concerning the franchised
business 5
c. Franchisee Employees
(1) Franchisor has right of
approval over franchised
business' manager 9 30
(2) Franchisor specifications about
Franchisee employees 32 56
d. Inspections
(1) Franchisor's right to inspect
Franchisee's business premises,
products, supplies, marketing
methods, etc. 79 91
e. Auditing-Franchisor right to an
accounting and an audit of the
Franchisee's business 79 90
f. No Franchisor Waiver of
Franchisee Default 74 87
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C. ORDINARY CoNTRAcT LAW CLAUSES
1. ROYALTIES AND OTHER FRANCHISE FEES
a. General provision requiring
Franchisee payment of an initial
franchise fee 83 100
(1) Median Amount - $20,000
b. General provision requiring
Franchisee payment of royalties 90 100
(1) Median Amount - 5% of
gross sales
c. Specific minimal amount to be paid
as royalties 12
(1) Median Amount $500 per
- month
d. Provision that renewed Franchisees
pay a Renewal Fee 7 23
(1) Median Amount - $3,000
e. Provision that Franchisees seeking
to move must pay a Relocation of
Franchise Fee 11
(1) Median Amount - $3,500
f. Transfer Fee (shifting franchise to
a new Franchisee) - 78
(1) Median Amount - $5,000
2. FRANCHISE TiME PERIODS, ARBITRATION
AND VENUE STIPULATIONS, AND
INSURANCE REQUImEMENTS
a. Length of Agreement:
(1) 20 Years - 38
(2) 15 Years - 24
(3) 10 Years - 20
(4) 5 Years - 5
(5) Unspecified - 4
(6) Other - 3
b. Venue stipulated 27 62
c. Arbitration clause 23 31
d. Mediation provision - 3
e. Comprehensive Liability Insurance 88 100
(Franchisee required to have, at its
expense)
(1) $300,000 - 2
(2) $500,000 1
(3) $1 Million 70
1994]





(7) No less than customary for the
Franchisees generally




a. Franchisor acknowledged as owner
of Confidential information which
has been disclosed to the
Franchisee and which is not to be
disclosed to unauthorized persons 64
b. Trademark Restrictions (on use of
trademark by Franchisee) 77
c. Requirement that terminated
Franchisee return to the Franchisor
all trademarked supplies, signs,
stationery, forms, or other materials 25
d. All Franchisee concepts become
Franchisor's exclusive property
4. DECLARATIONS ABoUT THE FRAN-
CHISEE'S REVIEW OF THE FRANCHISE
CoNTRAcr BEFORE SIGNING IT
a. Statement advising Franchisee to
obtain legal counsel about the
franchise contract
b. Provision that Franchisee has had
the opportunity to obtain
clarification about any aspects of
the proposed franchise
c. Statement that Franchisee obtained
the advice of independent legal,
accounting, and/or other advisors
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d. Statement that Franchisee has
received no guarantees,
representations, warranties or the
like as to the profitability of the
franchise being purchased, and that
Franchisee has conducted its own
independent investigation of the
merits of this investment - 85
5. PROVISION THAT FRANCHISEE IS AN 64 91
INDEPENDENT CONTRACroR; No
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
a. Franchisee required to post notices
informing public of its independent
status 21
6. STATEMENT THAT THERE IS No 10
FIDUCrARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FRANCHISOR AND FRANCHISEE
7. MERGER CLAUSE (FOR PURPOSES OF 79
HAVING AN INTEGRATED WRITING UNDER
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE)
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